

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

12 October 1944
1930A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 212)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 212)

This is Plan Able.

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (BUDAPEST Sectional) 1:500,000

GSCS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (GRAZ Section:1) 1:500,000

GSCS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (HOGRAD Sectionn1) 1:500,000

Target Charts: No. 12-20-NA (ALNxSPNxITO 0/2) for approach.

No. 12-30-NA MAGYSKAMIZSA)

No. 8-21-NA (OSIJET)

Photographs: Print No. 5020 (BAMMIDA)

Print No. 4008 (BAMMIDA)

H.I. Report No. 164 (TATARANA and GALLA) shows RANHIDA M/Y

Red Force target material: See Intelligence Annex No. 11.

1. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) BLECHHAMMER: Reference is made to E Map No. 2697 dated 5 October 1944. Enroute avoid the 52 heavy guns of OSTRAVA, 12 guns at GYOR and 8 guns at VESZPREM (4707-1755)

(2) BANMIDA: There is no report of any flak defenses at the target. Visual observation report gun positions in the surrounding area of target which means SIH-MIH flak may be encountered. Enroute avoid defenses North of LAKE BALATON.

(3) KOMAROM: No change. Last two attacks drew from SAH to MIH.

(4) ERSEMUJVAR: No flak reported.

(5) OSIJET: No flak reported. Last attacked on 21 September by P-38s, and no flak encountered.

(6) NAGYSKAMIZSA: No flak reported at target. At 4632-1644 there are 6 heavy guns whose outer limit is about five miles from the target.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) Red Force: Although the enemy has not attempted interception of bombers in recent attacks in the VIENNA area, the fact remains that the enemy is capable of interception by 60-70 SEF. If weather conditions are good at the target, enemy opposition is not likely to exceed 30-40 SEF. Should weather conditions render visual bombing impossible, Fifteenth Air Force estimates that opposition may be nil or by a small effort of the enemy. On return route the enemy has capabilities of a few second sorties or 60-70 first sorties from the VIENNA-GYOR area.

(2) Blue Force: The enemy will have a choice of attacking either force in strength of capabilities. If the VIENNA e/a are airborne, Fifteenth Air Force believes that the fighters will oppose the Red Force on penetration; with the Blue Force operations timed 30 minutes later, the e/a may not be available to attack these formations.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS

(1) BLECHHAMMER South remains the highest priority oil target in this theatre. Intelligence sources reveal a great deal of current activity at the plant. Estimate present production at 28,000 tons of gasoline per month.

(2) BANMIDA: Transportation problems in HUNGARY are mounting all lines available are needed for rapid movement of troops and supplies. In addition the routes are crowded with refugees. Although the yards at BANMIDA are not large, they are an important link in the BUDAPEST-GYOR-VIENNA line. The East yard, also known as the South yard, based on cover of 8 October, contained 520 goods wagons.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Red Force: Three Bombardment Wings including this Wing attack BLECHHAMMER South O/R.

b. Blue Force: 5th and 49th Bombardment Wings attack FLORISDORF O/R.

304th Bombardment Wing (4 Groups) destroy rolling stock at SZEKESFENHARVAR M/Y.

47th Bombardment Wing: 2 Groups attack VIENNA N M/Y. 2 Groups attack BANMIDA N M/Y.

c. The XV Fighter Command will provide penetration, target and withdrawal escort for the Red Force.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

JAMES D. BOOK,
Major, AC,
Ass't. A-2.

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