

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (HV)
APO 520 US ARMY

14 November 1944
1745A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 250)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 250)

This is Plan Charlie

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (WIEN; MUNCHEN, GRAZ, BOLZANO)
1:500,000

GSGS No. 3982 EUROPE Air (LINZ, GRAZ, PASSAU) 1:250,000

Briefing Chart No. 14-50A-NA (LINZ)

Target Chart No. 14-50-NA (LINZ)

Briefing Chart No. BC 14-7 (HERMANN GOERING, etc)

Approach Chart, Target Photochart No. AC,TP 14-7 (HERMANN GOERING,
etc)

Target Area Oblique, Target Photochart Oblique No. TAO, TPO 14-7
(HERMANN GOERING, etc)

Pathfinder Chart No. 20 (LINZ and STEYR, AUSTRIA) 1:180,000

Pathfinder Supplement: Positive Relief Chart, Negative Relief Chart,
South Central EUROPE, 1:2,892,000

Pathfinder Supplement No. RPC-9-F(LINZ, AUSTRIA)

Illustration No, 5(a)53a/4; 6(d) (vi)79/1 (LINZ)

Report No: H(I) 259, 7 June 1944

Report No. 15SG/810/5 November 1944, with photographs (LINZ)

1. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK: Refer to "E" Map No. 2728 (7 October 1944), No. 2783 (11 October 1944), and No. 2781 (11 October 1944) as amended by "E" Report No. 4E25 (31 October 1944). On 16 October MIH to IAH was encountered; on 4 November Scant to Moderate Inaccurate to Accurate heavy flak was encountered. On axis prescribed bombers will be exposed to flak approximately 5 minutes. It is reasonable to expect the accuracy of this flak to be less on a PFF Mission. En route the 8 heavy guns at RIED and the 18 heavy guns at PASSAU will be avoided by strict adherence to prescribed course.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT: Intelligence Annex Fifteenth Air Force advises that there is slight probability of interception of bombers by day fighters, but states that there is a possibility of interception of bombers on this type of mission by night fighters. In other words, interception by night fighters is the logically anticipated enemy fighter reaction to this type of mission. Crews will be briefed on this possibility.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGET:

(1) See Intelligence Annex No. 234, 3 November 1944, paragraphs 1, c, (1) and (2).

(2) The results of the attack on LINZ on 4 November 1944, as disclosed by reconnaissance, demonstrate the feasibility of attacking this target by PFF a/c. The experiences of PFF operators in the several Bombardment Groups varied to a certain extent, but it proved to be evident that the target could be identified. It is believed that if pre-briefing study of all available target materials is accomplished, and the experiences of PFF operators is exchanged and pooled, it will be of material benefit. PFF operators on 4 November 1944 mission stated that the DANUBE RIVER, with its canalized branches, could be seen in the scope: It is well within the bounds of possibility, if certain "breaks" are favorable, that the specific target can be hit, either by direct identification or by offset methods,

(3) The tactical need for striking the BENZOL PLANT inheres in the fact that this part only of the HERMANN GOERING Works at LINZ escaped previous attacks undamaged, it thus represents a target which must be eliminated to secure the ultimate objective of the counter-oil attacks.

(4) Such spillage beyond the assigned target as is probable in non-visual bombing will have definite military value, The attack on 4 Nov 44 practically removes the HERMANN GOERING Works from the target list. But the adjacent Marshalling Yards, likely to be covered by spillage, are a highly profitable target,

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of this attack on Oil and Communications targets in GERMANY, in which PFF methods will be used and bombing will be by individual a/c, is as follows:

(1) 5th Wing, 36 PFF a/c attacks LINZ BENZOL PLANT.

(2) 304th Wing, 20 PFF a/c, attacks LINZ BENZOL PLANT.

(3) 47th Wing, 16 FFF a/c, attacks INNSBRUCK M/Y.

(4) 49th Wing, 12 PFF a/c, attacks INNSBRUCK M/Y.

b. No fighter escort is provided for this mission. Experience has proved, to date, that none is required. In weather involved in PFF operations of this type, cloud cover and the element of surprise have been adequate protection.

c. Escape Intelligence: No new information; see current Escape Bulletins.

d. POW camps: For location of POW camps in the LINZ area, see tele type FFW D 445, 10 November 1944, and brief accordingly.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

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A-2.

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