

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

5 December 1944

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 272)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 272)

This is Plan Able

Maps: GSGS No, 4072 EUROPE Air (GRAZ, FIUME) 1:500,000

GSGS No, 3982 EUROPE Air (SOPRON, VIENNA) 1:250,000

Briefing and Target Charts:

No. 15-1-NA (BRATISLAVA.)

No. 8-107-NA (MARIBOR)

No. 8-4-NA (ZAGREB)

Approach Chart No. AC 12-23 (GYOR) shows HEGYESHALOM

Communications Report No. HC 217 (ZAGREB)

Target Report No. TR 218 photo No, 7003 (BRATISLAVA)

Interpretation Reports:

No. DB 226 (HEGVSHALOM)

No. DB 263,261,253 (MARIBOR)

No. 244 (ZAGREB)

Photographs No. 5015 end 3059 (HEGYSHALOM)

PIR No. G435 (ZAGREB)

1. Fifteenth Air Force Intelligence Annex states this plan is for the purpose of throwing the weight of the Strategic Air Force behind the Ground Forces in the Battle of LAKE BALATON. The targets selected are the most active rail yards on all the main lines radiating East and South from VIENNA. The objective is to destroy the military supplies in the yard and to cause temporary interruption of the flow of supplies by blocking the through tracks. These targets are expected to be jammed by desperate enemy attempts to reinforce his troops South of the Lake where he was caught off guard by the RUSSIAN move from the South while the major portion of the GERMAN-HUNGARIAN forces were pinned down Northeast of BUDAPEST. The importance of these operations to the success of the RUSSIAN effort to break through into GERMAN home territory cannot be overemphasized. Fifteenth Air Force teletype states this will probably be our last chance to strike directly at GERMAN troops in this area.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) BRATISLAVA: Refer to map E2725 (5 Oct 44) as amended by reports 4E6 (23 Oct 44) and 4E157 (30 Nov 44).

The axis as ordered avoids the main concentrations to the South with the expected time in flak being from 1 1/2 to 2 minutes. The general activity of troops and equipment will probably result in a protective cover by flak barges on the DANUBE, flak cars on the railroads, and increases in flak defenses in marshalling yards and at bridges and intersections.

(2) HEGYESHALOM: There are no "E" reports of flak in this area. Flak defenses may be expected at this M/Y since it is located on the rail line from VIENNA to the front.

(3) MARIBOR: Refer to map 4E132 (25 Nov 44). Expected time in flak will be 3 minutes. On the previous two attacks, Moderate to Intense Accurate Heavy flak was encountered.

(4) ZAGREB: Refer to map E2503 (11 Sept 44) as last amended by report 3E191 (21 Nov 44). Expected time in flak will be 3 minutes. On 1 Nov 44, formations encountered Moderate Accurate Heavy flak. Additional flak may be expected in this area approximately 50 miles from the Partisan's penetration from the South.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) Enemy capabilities remain at 50-60 SEF in the VIENNA-LAKE BALATON area. These aircraft may already be committed in support of the GERMAN Ground Forces.

(2) There is a possibility that the enemy can put up 15 ME-109 a/c in Northern YUGOSLAVIA. These fighters, if they establish contact, are more likely to attempt interception on withdrawal, rather than on penetration.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS

(1) BRATISLAVA: The RANGIER M/Y is located North of the city. Trains to BUDAPEST are made up in this yard using cars from the VIENNA and the CZECHOSLOVAKIA industrial areas. Facilities include a small repair area, equipped with two car repair sheds and a turntable, and classification and storage siding. Reconnaissance has shown this yard to be increasingly active. Latest cover shows 480 units present. This is cover of 1 December and later reports from sources other than photography indicate this number to be far below the expected content.

A successful attack on this yard would destroy supplies urgently needed by the enemy to stabilize his Southern front.

(2) HEGYESHALOM: This M/Y is located on the other of the two main lines from VIENNA to BUDAPEST. Its facilities include a small roundhouse, several warehouses, coal supplies for the steam operated rail line, and classification and storage sidings. Its functions include sorting, storage, and refueling. Reconnaissance of 1

November shows 700 units present but it is very likely that this is only a fraction of the present content of the yard. A successful attack on the yard would block one of the through lines to BUDAPEST, destroy supplies urgently needed in the attempt to stop the advancing RUSSIAN armies.

(3) MARIBOR: See Intelligence Annex No. 247, 12 Nov 44.

(4) ZAGREB: The East M/Y is located on the main line from North YUGOSLAVIA to the front South of LAKE BALATON. It could be used as a by-pass line in the event it remained open and the other lines to this front were cut. The primary function of the yard is storage and classification and recent reconnaissance has shown it to be active in that respect. Photographs taken 3 December Show 590 mixed units in the yard.

3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. This is an attack by the Fifteenth Air Force against oil targets in GERMANY and communications targets in AUSTRIA and HUNGARY in direct support of the RUSSIAN Ground Forces. Coordination is as follows:

- (1) 5th Wing, 6 Groups, attacks BRUX O/R.
- (2) 47th Wing: 2 Groups attack SZOMBATHELY M/Y
2 Groups attack SOPRON M/Y
- (3) 49th Wing, 3 Groups, attacks MARIBOR M/Ys
- (4) 304th Wing, 4 Groups, attacks GRAZ M/Ys

b. XV Fighter Command (Prov) provides strong close escort for the 5th Wing, general target area cover for the 47, 49, 55, and 304th Wings, and strafes motor and rail traffic between SZOMBATHELY and VIENNA and between HEGYSLALOM and VIENNA.

c. Crews will be briefed on the location of the latest bomb line as given in teletype FFW D 501, 5 Dec 44.

d. Escape: Western HUNGARY offers three alternatives depending upon location.

- (1) Lie low in country districts and wait for the RUSSIANS.
- (2) Make for the RUSSIAN lines South of LAKE BALATON.
- (3) For Partisan assistance, make for MARIBOR area, particularly hills on the East side.

e. Attention is directed to POW camps No. 132, 149, 150 and
151.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

PERRY F. SOLLARS
Major, AC
Asst A-2

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