

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)  
APO 520 US ARMY

2 December 1944  
1745A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 270 )  
TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 270 )

This is Plan Able

RED FORCE

Maps: GSGS No: 4072 EUROPE Air (WIEN; MUNCHEN, GRAZ, BOLZANO)  
1:500,000

GSGS No. 3982 EUROPE Air (LINZ, GRAZ, PASSAU) 1:250,000

Briefing and Target Charts:'.  
No. 14-50A-NA (LINZ)

No. 14-4-NA (KLAGENFURT)

No. 14-44-NA (VILLACH)

Pathfinder Chart No. 20 (LINZ and STEYR, AUSTRIA) 1:180,000

No. RPC 9,9-B,9-C,9-F, LINZ, AUSTRIA C27

No. RPC 9-A for pre-briefing study; this chart will not be taken  
in air on mission.

1. This plan calls for the continued attacks upon communications targets in AUSTRIA and Southern GERMANY in which PFF bombing by individual a/c supplements the heavy tonnage of Air Force multi-Group formations. The military objectives at Primary and Alternate Targets are such as can be hit by PFF and are such as are effective for bombing by individual a/c. Previous experience, particularly the mission of 4 November 1944, has demonstrated that the assigned target area in LINZ can be picked up on the PFF scope and bombed by PFF methods. The morale effect of this type of operation is considerable and is of high profitability in target value.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) LINZ: Refer to E Map 4E77 (12 Nov 44) as amended by reports 4E110 (24 Nov 44), 4E122 (25 Nov 44), 4E133 (26 Nov 44) and 4E164 (30 Nov 44). On 19 Nov 44 a daylight PFF mission, MIH to IAH flak was encountered, and this is the enemy capability at present. The 12 Heavy Guns at WELS have been removed from the defenses of this area. The expected time in flak on the axis ordered, will be approximately 6 minutes. The route as ordered avoids defenses of MUHLDOFF, PASSAU, and BRAUNAU. Intelligence Officers briefing on flak will not state the number of batteries or guns at target.

(2) VILLACH: Refer to Map 4E81 (14 Nov 44). The maximum enemy capability at this target is SAH.

(3) KLAGENFURT: Refer to map 4E82 (14 Nov 44). On two previous PFF mission, one in daylight, 3 Nov 44 and one early morning 30 Nov 44 no flak was encountered at this target.

Maximum enemy capability is S-MAH, with Scant the more probable.

b. EVELY AIRCRAFT: In view of the forecast of the advance of the RUSSIANS it is probable that there will be negligible or nil e/a opposition at LINZ or alternate targets, although the enemy has capability of putting up a few night fighters for day operations in the LINZ area. ITALIAN Fascist fighters are capable of 25-30 sorties; these may attack unescorted bombers en route or on return - see paragraph below.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS:

(1) The primary objective at LINZ is rolling stock in M/Ys, numbering 2325 units at latest reconnaissance. Military objectives in general area are suitable for PFF attack, particularly any part of the HERMANN GOERING steel Works, Ordnance Stores, and barracks. The city of LINZ as a large industrial and communications center is itself a priority target.

(2) VILLACH: See Intelligence Annex No. 244, 10 Nov 44, par. 1,c,(4). At latest reconnaissance 750 units were present (24 Nov 44).

(3) KLAGENFURT: This small city of 30,000 population is industrial and has rail junctions; these warrant PFF bombing by individual a/c. The M/Y measures approximately 375' X 2400'. On 24 Nov 44 there were 400 units present. Adjacent to the M/Y is a former a/c components factory. Spillage into residential area will be of value to the objective of deteriorating enemy morale.

2. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Coordination of attack:

(1) 5th Wing (18 PFF a/c), 47th Wing (12 PFF a/c), and 304<sup>th</sup> wing (12 PFF a/c) attack LINZ, AUSTRIA, Industrial area.

(2) 49th Wing (8 PFF a/c) attacks INNSBRUCK, GERMANY M/Y.

b. XV Fighter Command (Provisional) provides a fighter sweep in UDINE area to cover the Air Force stream of bombers on penetration and withdrawal.

c. Prisoner of War Camps: In addition to camps in Primary Target area, camp at SPITTAL is close to route.

d. Escape Intelligence: no new information.

#### BLUE FORCE

Maps: GSGS No. 4072 EUROPE Air (FIUME) 1:500,000

GSGS No. 4396 YUGOSLAVIA Sheet 48 (BROD) 1:100,000

Target and briefing Chart No. 8-36-NA (RROD)

Communications Reports No. H. 71 (RROD), No. HC 626 (BROD)

Photographic Interpretation Reports No. G425 and G426 (BROD)

1. This is an attack in direct support of the Ground Forces in their effort to complete the destruction of the enemy force remaining in YUGOSLAVIA. The object of the attack is to destroy the lines of communication necessary for a successful evacuation and destroy the supplies and supply channels used in rear guard fighting. As the RUSSIAN armies close in from the East and the YUGOSLAVIAN National Army of Liberation closes in from the South and West the situation becomes more and more critical for the enemy. The destruction of supplies and lines of communication will further complicate their problems and be of great assistance to the Allied forces in the current drive to eliminate the GERMANS in the BALKANS.

#### 2. ENEMY SITUATION

##### a. FLAK

BROD: Refer to E map 2585 (20 Sept 44) as last amended by report 3E194 (22 Nov 44). Since the target is a vital communications point for the enemy's withdrawal, the marshalling yard and intersections in this area as well as all highways and railroads leading North will be heavily defended.

##### b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) Enemy capabilities remain at 15 ME-109s in the ZAGREB area with greater possibility of opposition existing upon withdrawal than upon penetration.

(2) Enemy opposition is not likely while our fighters are present in the Central YUGOSLAVIA area but there is a possibility that up to 10 ME-109s may be airborne to attack our formation should a favorable opportunity present itself.

##### c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS

(1) BROD South IY is located on the BROD-SARAJEVO rail line. Facilities include both sorting and storage sidings and four repair sheds 60' by 140' set at a slight angle to the through tracks in the center of the yard. Probable uses of the yard include

classification, storage, and wagon repair. The main line for supplies to the enemy forces in Central YUGOSLAVIA has been the BROD-SARAJEVO rail line.

Latest reconnaissance shows 890 units of rolling stock including tank cars, in the marshalling yard and the through tracks open and in use. The destruction of this quantity of supplies, even more important in the event there are fuel supplies present, would be a serious blow to the enemy. The destruction of the through tracks will cut his most vital supply line. This line is made even more important by the known shortage of fuel for motor transport.

(2) BROD RR Bridge is a vulnerable link in the rail line to SARAJEVO. This bridge was originally a steel and masonry bridge but the attack of 3 September destroyed the north two spans of this bridge. This has been hastily rebuilt using reinforced pontoons as the support for the bridge. The bridge is 1700 feet long and 30 feet wide. Both approaches are built on a fill and are more vulnerable than normal for that reason. Repairs to this bridge will be difficult at this time because of the high water in the main swollen river. The importance of cutting all through tracks in the marshalling yard with the additional importance of being more difficult to repair.

(3) BROD Road Bridge is a concrete highway bridge 1000 feet long and 30 feet wide. Part of the original bridge was destroyed in the attack of 8 September and has since been repaired using reinforced pontoons as the support. These weaker sections make the bridge vulnerable to air attack. If the rail lines are cut, this bridge will be the only communication line across the river. If this bridge is cut it will increase the load on the rail lines in the event they remain open. The importance of cutting both this bridge and the rail bridge is attested by the fact that we are assigned them as a target to make sure they will be cut in the event prior attacks fail.

### 3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. This is an attack on communications in AUSTRIA and YUGOSLAVIA coordinated as follows:

(1) 5th Wing, 6 Groups, attacks VIENNA S.E. Goods Siding.

(2) 47th Wing, 4 Groups, attacks BROD Bridges.

(3) 49th Wing, 3 Groups, attacks ALI PASAN MOST M/Y.

(4) 304th Wing, 2 Groups, attacks VISEGRAD Road Bridge.

b. XV Fighter Command (Provisional) provides escort on penetration, at target and on withdrawal for 5th wing and target cover for 47th, 49th, 55th, and 304th wings.

c. Escape: See current bulletins.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

DONALD W. RIDDLE,  
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A-2.

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