

HEADQUARTERS 55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (Hv)
APO 520 US ARMY

1 December 1944
1945A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 268)

TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 268)

This is plan Able

Maps: GSGS No. 4072, EUROPE Air (PRAHA, KRAKOW, TATRY, WIEN, BUDAPEST)
1:500,000

GSGS No. 3932, EUROPE Air (GLEIWITZ, TESAMEN, BRNO) 1:250,000

Target and Briefing Charts No. 13-108A NA (BLECHHAMMER)

No. 15-15-NA (MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA)

Briefing chart No. 13-24 (BLECHHAMMER)

No. BC 15-3 (PRIVOZ)

Target chart No. 12-20-N1 (ALMASPUZITO)

Minimum Briefing Chart

No. MPC 12-14 (ALMASPUZITO)

Pathfinder Charts No. PC 23A and PC 23 Supplement (BLECHHAMMER)

1:250,000

Pathfinder Chart No. PC 34 (MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA) 1:250,000

Pathfinder Charts No. RPC-4, 4-A (BLECHHAMMER)

No. RPC-5, 5-A, 5-F (MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA)

Note: (PC's No. RFC-4A and 5A will not be taken in air on mission)

Special Scope Photo 3262 (BLECHHAMMER)

Target photochart No. TP 13-2, 13-2A (BLECHHAMMER)

Target Area Oblique No. TAO 15-3 (PRIVOZ)

Target Photochart Oblique No. TPO 15-3 (PRIVOZ)

Target No. 1(a)(iii)43/ Perspective (Aug. 1943) BLECHHAMMER (GERMANY)

Minimum Photochart No. MP 12-14 (ALMASPUZITO)

Approach Charts No: AC 15-3 (PRIVOZ)

Report No. H(I)185, 232, 258 (BLECHHAMMER)

No. H(I)189 (PRIMOSER etc)

No. H(I)130 (ALMASFUZITO)

Report No. H(c)518 (MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA)

Report No. DB 133, 146, 152, 172, 188, 241 (BLECHHAMMER)

No. DB 177, 265 (ALMASPUZITO)

Target Information Sheet, Op. No. GQ 1569 (BLECHHAMMER)

Photograph Mo. 4025 329-459 5PG 27 Nov. 44 (BLECHHAMMER)

No. 3015 60 PR 522, 25 June 1944 (MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA)

1. Combined Strategic Targets Committee in ENGLAND and Fifteenth Air Force analysts agree that the stoppage of production at the nine most important plants, which includes the BLECHHAMMER Complex, will reduce the enemy's gasoline supply in December to a critical point. Four of these plants were hit visually 30 November by the Eighth Air Force. It cannot be over emphasized that this situation creates a

great opportunity for decisive blows against the enemy. We are taking advantage of this opportunity.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. FLAK

(1) BLECHHAMMER: Refer to E Map 2697 (5 Oct 44) as amended by E Report 2377 (17 Oct 44). On 20 November, a PFF mission, intense accurate flak was encountered. Formation will be in flak approximately 6 minutes. Enroute additional flak may be encountered in the DANUBE Area.

(2) MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA: Refer to E Map 2717 (6 Oct 44) as amended by Reports E2795 (11 Oct 44) and 4E120 (25 Nov 44). The 49 runs are concentrated such that all guns can fire at the formation. Time in flak will be approximately 31 minutes.

(3) ALMASPUZITO O/R: E Report 2876 (17 Oct 44) shows 7 heavy guns defending the target. At KAMAROM, there are an additional 4. However since this target is not too far distant from Front lines, additional flak may be expected along DANUBE and at railroad and highway intersections.

b. ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(1) In North YUGOSLAVIA the enemy is capable of opposing our formations with approximately 15 ME-109s. It is suggested that these are more likely to attempt interception of our formations upon return than to resist penetration.

(2) Enemy capabilities in the VIENNA-BALATON area are 50 single engine fighters. In view of the probability that these forces will already be committed to support of ground forces in the defense of BUDAPEST negligible or nil opposition is likely in this area.

(3) Enemy capabilities remain at 20 to 30 fighters in the BLECHHAMMER.

c. SIGNIFICANCE OF TARGETS

(1) BLECHHAMMER South shows evidence of energetic repairs at the time of the reconnaissance of 27 November. It is estimated that this refinery could possibly be repaired enough to permit operations to be resumed at approximately 40 percent of the original capacity within two or three weeks of that date. This plant had an original capacity of more than ODERTAL and BLECHHAMMER North combined. For that reason it must remain inoperative. It is fitting that the job is assigned to the Wing that succeeded in stopping operations on the last attack.

(2) MORAVSKA/OSTRAVA (PRIVOZ) O/R is one of the few refineries in EUROPE that is still producing at its normal rate. Its annual capacity is 50,000 tons. The location of this refinery with reference to rail facilities increases its importance since recent operations have caused the enemy to use a large part of his fuel reserves and depend upon day by day production.

(3) ALMASPUZITO O/R is one of HUNGARYS largest with a reported annual capacity of 163,000 tons. This refinery was severely damaged on the attack of 9 August by the Fifteenth Air Force. Reconnaissance since that time has shown constant repair activity. Recent cover does not reveal the exact state of activity but suggests the possibility that the plant may be active. This plant has large storage facilities in conjunction with the refinery and it is likely that they will be in use if the remainder of the refinery is not completely repaired.

3. FRIENDLY SITUATION

a. Fifteenth Air Force will attack oil and communications targets in Southern GERMANY and AUSTRIA with maximum effort of 36 aircraft per Group. Coordination is as follows:

- (1) 5th Wing, 6 Groups, attacks BLECHHAMMER North.
- (2) 47th Wing, 4 Groups, attacks STRASMOF M/Y.
- (3) 49th Wing, 3 Groups, attacks BLECHHAMMER South.
- (4) 304th Wing, 4 Groups, attacks ODERTAL O/R.

b. Fifteenth Fighter Command (Provisional) provides general route and target cover on penetration, at the target, and on withdrawal for the forces attacking BLECHHAMMER and ODERTAL.

c. ESCAPE INTELLIGENCE: Current Bulletins.

d. POW Camps in BLECHHAMMER area numbers 76, 86, 87, 109, and 110 on map of POW Camps, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, 9 November 1944.

By command of Brigadier General ACHESON:

PERRY F. SOLLARS,
Major, AC,
Ass't. A-2.

DISTRIRUTION:

1 cy ea CG, A-2 Duty O, Fifteenth Air Force
1 cy CG, XV Fighter Command
1 cy ea CG, A-2, A-3, PI, 55th Bomb Wing
3 cys ea 464, 485 Gps, 55th Bonb Wing
4 cys on 460, 465 Gps, 55th Bonb Wing