1. General Summary. On 7 Feb 45, 155 B-24 a/c (158 a/c scheduled) took off from 0825-0930A to attack targets in AUSTRIA and Northern ITALY. There were one hundred and fifty-five (155) effective sorties and eleven (11) non-effective sorties.

The force attacking TRIESTE Harbor Installations was composed of 40 a/c (37 from the 460th Group; 1 from the 464th Group, and 2 from the 465th Group). At 1413A, 40 a/c from 25,000' dropped 78.25 tons of 500 1b RDX .1 .01 .025 bombs. Flak encountered was S-MAH. Bombing was accomplished visually.

The force attacking POLA Harbor Oil Storage facilities was composed of 40 a/c from the 485th Bombardment Group. At 1412A, these a/c from 20,000' dropped 76.5 tons of 500 lb RDX .1 .01 .025 by visual means. MAH flak was encountered for approximately 2 minutes.

55 a/c (36 from the 464th Bomb Group, 18 from the 465th Bomb Group, and 1 a/c from the 460th Bomb Group) attacked the FLORISDORF O/R. At 1407-1408A from 24,500-25,000' a total of 109.75 tons of 500 lb RDX .1 .01 .025 bombs were dropped. M-IAH flak was encountered for 5-7 minutes.

8 a/c of the 465th Bombardment Group from 24,500' at 1455A attacked the FIORISDORF O/R. These a/c lost the formation and as a result bombed 37 minutes later than the main formation.

Results:

POLA O/S (485 Gp) - Photos show numerous strikes in the area of the oil storage tanks. Smoke from first bombs quickly obscured tank area, so the possibility of direct hits by later bombs exists but cannot be observed accurately.

TRIESTE HARBOR INSTALLATIONS (460 Gp) - Photos show strikes on ship yards South of MUZZIA Bay. Direct hits are visible on ships and two small destroyer escorts. Another concentration of strikes is visible covering the marshalling yard, RR shops area, and adjacent area to the East. A few scattered hits are noted in the residential area to the North.

There was no enemy air opposition to these operations. 2 ME-109s and 2 FW-190s were observed enroute by one unit. Additional flak encountered as follows: VIRAZDIN SIH; 4820-1630 SAH; LETENYE SAH; NAGYKANIZSA SAH.

Three Groups report no escort. One unit observed escort occasionally after the target.

Weather: At base, 8-10/10 Stratocumulus from 4500 to 10,000'. Enroute, 3/10 low clouds over YUGOSLAVIA. 10/10 over the ALPS at

20,000'. Target, 5/10 cirrus at 25,000' with visibility 12 to 15 miles. Weather enroute to base was same as route out.

141 a/c landed at home bases from 1543-1715A. 4 a/c landed at friendly fields. 1 a/c is listed as missing.

2. 460th Bomb Group. On 7 Feb 45, at 0825A, 40 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. Group assembly was accomplished with some difficulty due to multi-layer clouds. Rendezvous with the 485th and the Wing was not effected, also because of clouds. No escort was seen. 2 a/c returned early.

1 a/c, a late take off, was unable to locate the formation and flew to the primary target with the 464th Group. From 25,800', two tons of bombs were released on the FLORISDORF O/R.

37 a/c, 19 a/c of 1st Group and 18 a/c of 2nd Group, were over the target at TRIESTE at 1413A. From 25,000', 37 a/c dropped 73.25 tons of 500 1b RDX bombs, .1N .01, .025T fusing.

38 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1600A.

3. 464th Bomb Group. On 7 Feb 45, 36 scheduled B-24 a/c, plus 5 assigned spares, took off commencing at 0930A to bomb the VIENNA Florisdorf O/R. The Group form-up was effected 9 miles N; of the base above the overcast. 3 a/c returned early.

37 a/c were over the target at 1407A and 36 a/c dropped 71 3/4 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs .1N .01 .025T from 25,000'.

Recapitulation of bomb tonnage disposition:

36 a/c dropped on target	71.75 tons
1 a/c of those over target jettisoned	.25 tons
1 a/c jettisoned near VIENNA	2.00 tons
1 a/c bombed TRIESTE	2.00 tons
2 a/c; E/Rs, jettisoned	4.00 tons
2 a/c, E/Rs, brought back to base	4.00 tons
Total	84.00 tons

Flak at the target was reported as very Intense and Accurate and lasting for a period of from 5 to 7 minutes. Crews report that the flak appeared to be tracking the formation.

At 1248A, 2 ME-109 a/c light or silver colored were observed at 4600-1450 at 23,500'. One e/a came from high at 12 o'clock in what appeared to be an attack on Baker Groups, however the e/a leveled off above the formation and passed over without opening fire. The second e/a skirted the formation at a distance. At this time P-38 a/c approached in pursuit of the e/a. Another crew reports that 5 ME-109 a/c were observed at 4550-1456 at 1245A at 22,000'. These e/a, described as rusty brown in color, made no effort to attack and

appeared to be looking for stragglers. 2 possible FW-190 a/c were observed at a distance making what appeared to be passes at a lone B-17 at about 1435A at 4737-1715 from 22,000'.

35 a/c landed at this base between 1625A and 1715A. The a/c that bombed TRIESTE landed at this base at 1350A. 1 a/c landed at a friendly field. 1 a/c is missing.

4. 465th Bomb Group. 34 of 36 a/c scheduled took off at 0950A, 7 Feb 45 to attack the FLORISDORF O/R at VIENNA. The Group assembled with considerable difficulty due to weather and finally effected a rendezvous with the 464th Group.

There were 5 non-effective sorties, 4 of which were E/Rs. 18 a/c of the first group want over the target at 1408A at 24, 500' and dropped 36 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs fused .1N .01 ,025T. 8 a/c of the second group went over the target at 1455A at 24,500' and dropped 16 tons of 500 lb bombs fused .1N .01 .025T.

2 a/c joined the 460th Group in the rendezvous area and dropped 3½ tons of 500 lb RDX on the TRIESTE Harbor Installations. 1 a/e was forced to turn back near the KLAGENFURT area and bombed St. VIET (4646-1422), a target of opportunity at 1323A, with unobserved results:

Recapitulation:

Tons dropped on Primary	52
Tons dropped on T/o	2
Tons dropped on TRIESTE	3½
Tons jettisoned	8½
Tons returned	4
Total	70

28 a/c landed at 1630A. 2 a/c landed at friendly fields.

5. 485th Bomb Group. On 7 Feb 45, 40 B-24 type a/c took off to bomb the POLA O/S, ITALY. There were no E/Rs.

40 a/c were over the target at 1412A. 40 a/c dropped 76.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs fused .1N .01 .025T from 20,000'.

39 a/c landed without incident between 1543 and 1624A. 1 a/c landed at friendly field.

BOMBING AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS

1. Bombing Analysis: A maximum effort of the 460th, 464th, 465th, and 485th Bomb Groups was dispatched against targets in AUSTRIA on 7 February 1945.

a. 465th Bomb Group: This Group, the Wing Leader, was dispatched against VIENNA KAGRAN O/R visually or the VIENNA FLORISDORF

O/R using PFF, in two Groups. Due to a mix up in the assembly area, caused by the weather, one box of the second unit became separated and joined the first unit. The target area was clear but the visual MPI was obscured by a smoke screen. The decision was made to attack the PFF target. Due to a poor interphone system, the Bombardier had trouble understanding the PFF operator. There were three sighting angles given to the Bombardier. 70-65-60 degrees, and the bombs were dropped using this synchronization. The second attack unit dropped their bombs on the first attack unit. There were three malfunctions reported in this group, 2 a/c were forced to salvo when the bombs failed to release electrically, and the other a/c salvoed the bombs in the front and rear bays on the right side due to a bent safety switch arm on that side. The second group of the 465th, consisted on one eight ship box, also made a PFF run. After two sighting angles had been relayed to the bombardier. He was able to pick up a section of the FLORISDORF O/R and displaced his cross hairs onto the target. Shortly before bombs away one ship of this box was hit by flak and forced to drop his bombs early. There were no malfunctions in this unit.

b. 464th Bomb Group: This group, flying second in the Wing formation, was also made up of two Groups. The first Group was able to see the IP and started a visual approach. After making a course correction it became evident that PFF would have to be used. Two sighting angles were given and the bombs were dropped. The leader of the second attack unit of the first Group also received two PFF sighting angles. The second Group started a PFF run but partially down the run it became evident that some visual corrections in course would be necessary. These corrections were made and the bombs dropped on PFF information. The second attack unit leader received four sighting corrections and two course corrections. Thore were five malfunctions in the Group due to inoperative intervalometers and stations. Three of the a/c checked out OK on the ground.

c. 460th Bomb Group: This Group was held on the ground by fog and when they did get into the air they were too late to make rendezvous. The lead a/c made the decision to attack the first alternate target, AF#1 (POLA). However when a run was started the target was cloud covered so the leader chose to go to a target of opportunity. This target was the TRIESTE Dock area. A visual run was started on a heading of 015 degrees. Hits were seen in the dock area, and the M/Y. The second unit of the first Group also made a visual run on the TRIESTE area with hits seen in the dock area, M/Y and in the shops in target area 2A on target chart 4-116-NA. The second Group of the 460th Bomb Group also attacked the TRIESTE area with visual runs. Some hits were observed in the target area. There were no malfunctions of any equipment in the two Groups.

d. 485th Bomb Group: This Group was assigned the first alternate target. They were unable to get into the air in time to make wing rendezvous. The target they were assigned was the POLA O/R. The leader had a blown fuse in his electrical system and had to salvo his bombs a bit late. His wing man had been following through and dropped his bombs on time. The only malfunction reported was that in the lead aircraft.

2. Navigation Analysis (BLUE FORCE): Poor base weather conditions hindered wing rendezvous which was eventually effected with three Groups just South of the Spur. The first 465th Group led the two 464th Groups over the Spur on course at 1054A. The second 465th Group was unable to find the formation and flew alone to its target.

The three Groups flew a course closely to that briefed, arriving at the keypoint LITIJA at 1249A on schedule and at an altitude of 20,700'. From LITIJA a course was flown to JUDENSBURG to MARBACH and from that point to the initial point. All Groups rallied to the left to MATZEN and from there returned to base via CIFER and KRIZEVCI.

The second 465th Group attempted to find the main formation but was unsuccessful. In the vicinity of ZARA the Group Leader decided to bomb FIUME and as the course was paralleled northward, that target became visible. The Group turned for a bomb run at CARAR, but clouds moved over the target before it was possible to make a run. As the Group turned off this abortive bomb run, the leader spotted some Groups of the 304th Wing and followed them to the general vicinity of YBBS (4821-1505). There, contact was lost and the Group continued on to the primary by itself. The Group passed over the keypoint LITIJA at 1328A and from there flew the briefed route to the target. Rally was left off the target to MATZEN as ordered and from there they returned to base via CIFER, ZALAEGERSZEG, CAKOVEC, SISAK, VIS and VIESTE.

Aside from the unfavorable conditions experienced at rendezvous weather was quite favorable along the entire route. After the base area had been left behind, conditions cleared so that pilotage could be relied upon for the entire mission.

All Groups were able to turn visually on the initial point HOLLABRUNN, but all Groups except the second 464th were forced to make most of their run by PFF due to haze and smoke conditions at the target. Bomb run data follows:

Group	AXAT	TGT TIME	BMBG ALT
465 First	133 degrees	1407A	24,300 feet
465 Second	140 degrees	1455A	25,500 feet
464 First	132 degrees	1407A	25,500 feet
464 Second	143 degrees	1413A	26,000 feet

The second Group of the 464th was the only one that reported fighter escort, and these were met on withdrawal at 1515A at a position (4440-1620). This escort consisted of about 20 P-38s which accompanied the group for about 15 minutes.

First 465 Group. Log good. Navigation excellent.

Second 465 Group. Log very good. Navigation excellent.

First 464 Group. Log very good. Navigation good.

Second 464 Group. Log very good. Navigation, good.

From a navigation standpoint this mission was well flown and there is no comment to be made along this line.

3. Navigation Analysis (460th Group):

Due to bad weather conditions at base both 460th Groups assembled and rendezvoused in Area IV. Base weather conditions hindered this operation, and they finally departed the area almost on hour late at 1113A with the point of departure at a position 4259-1637. The 485th Groups which were scheduled to follow the 460th Groups were not able to get to the rendezvous area on time.

As it was considered unwise to bomb the primary target, the group took a heading for the first alternate, POLA. At a position 4508-1451, the group leader found POLA cloud-obscured and decided to bomb FIUME. The briefed initial point for FIUME, FONTANA DI CONTE was reached at 1243A at an altitude of 21,500'. The group leader commenced a run on the target, but it became cloud-obscured so he decided to attempt another run on a different axis starting from a position 4500-1422. Just before the bomb-release line was reached, clouds again obscured the target, and the Group rallied left and took a heading for POLA. They turned on a bomb run on POLA at a position 4435-1336 but again found the target cloud-obscured. Turning off the bomb run, the Group took up a heading for TRIESTE, which was visible, at a position 4518-1335. The Groups rallied to the right to a position 4508-1335 and from this point made good a return to ANCONA and then to base.

Low and medium clouds in the base area prevented Wing rendezvous and hindered Group assembly. Flak caused no difficulties enroute.

Both Groups turned approximately on the initial point mentioned above. A visual run on the TRIESTE arca was possible. Bomb run data follows;

Group	Axat	Tgt Time	Bmbg Alt
Lead	15 degrees	1356A	21,300 feet

Second 12 degrees 1357A 23,250 feet

Lead Group. Navigation good. Log not neat and difficult to road.

Second Group. Navigation good. Log good.

The navigation was good on this mission, but the weather was most unfavorable. There is no comment to be made.

4. Navigation Analysis (485 Group): The two 485 Groups had no difficulty in assembling, although weather had made take-off too late for them to rendezvous with the 460th Groups.

The lead 485 Group was at the turnpoint (4351-1402) at 1311A and arrived at the IP for the first alternate, SAN LORENZO DEL PASENATICO at 1408A. Rally was right off the target and from there a course was flown to ANCONA and to base.

Navigation throughout the mission was hindered by poor visibility and clouds.

The initial point was picked up visually and a visual bomb run was made. Bomb run data is as follows: Axis of attack, 163 degrees; bombing altitude, 20,000; and target time, 1412A.

Navigation good. Log missing position data in many cases, satisfactory.

There is no comment to be made on the navigation for this mission.

5. Pathfinder Navigation Analysis:

a. 465th Group: PFF was used only as a check on pilotage navigation enroute to the target. Visibility was good over most the route. The Mickey operator was able to inform the navigator of location of known flak areas and assisted in directing the formation around such areas. The turn over the IP was made using visual methods, however, due to a smoke screen and light haze over the target area the bomb run was started using PFF methods. The Mickey operator gave the bombardier three sighting angles and had the course killed when bombardier was able to identify target. No equipment malfunctions wore reported. Coordination among lead crews was good.

b. 464th Group: Pathfinder was used for navigation purposes on the route up the ADRIATIC Sea. However, from the coast of YUGOSLAVIA to the target, VIENNA, pilotage points were used by the nose navigators, PFF fixes were used as pilotage checked. The target area was first identified by Mickey operators from a distance of 45 miles. Pilotage was used to start the formation on its bomb run. Haze covered the target, however, so PFF was used to set up course, and the first

two sighting angles. On the return route the Pathfinder was used to check pilotage points. From fair to excellent returns were reported by Mickey operators.

c. 460th Group: PFF was used for navigation only inasmuch as the bombing was visual. Rendezvous was in area #4, and PFF was used during most of the time because of the undercast. PFF was used for navigational purposes to the target area and to avoid known flak areas, Two bomb runs were started on FIUME and two on POLA, with the aid of PFF, but because of the heavy undercast it was necessary to turn off the bombing runs. A visual run was finally made on TRIESTE. PFF was a great aid in navigating on the return route to the base. H2X equipment in the lead plane was working very poorly in the vicinity of the target. Other sets functioned fairly good, with the exception of one set, which was completely out. Fixes were given to DR navigators approximately every ten minutes. One PFF a/c was unable to find the formation and joined another group which bombed FLORISDORF at VIENNA.

d. 485th Group: PFF was used only as an aid to navigation because of visual conditions over most of the route. Fixes were given to the lead DR navigator approximately every ten minutes and to the group on VHF every half hour. The turn on the bomb run was aided by PFF, and the Mickey operator gave two sighting angles to the bombardier before the latter took over and bombed POLA visually. All PFF operators followed through on the scope on the bomb run. Coordination between all lead teams was excellent. PFF equipment in the lead ship worked exceptionally good. One other PFF a/c had modulator trouble. It is believed the 715 tubo went out. Another PFF a/c was believed to have had set failure on the bomb run because of flak damage.

FIGHTER ESCORT

14th Fighter Group

On 7 Feb 45 between 1016-39A, 64 P-38s took off to provide escort for the 49th and 55th Bombardment Wings. Due to a taxi accident on the field during take offs squadrons set course separately and did not fly together. 13 a/c of the 49th Sq made R/V with the 49th Wing at 1206A at 24,000’ at 4708-1440 approximately as briefed. 13 a/c escorted bombers to the IP and 2 minutes later, at 1320 at 26500' began to drop chaff. 1/4 mile ahead and 1000’ above bombers on a heading of 152° at 200 MPH. Dropping finished at 1322 at 4818-1616. 13 P-38s furnished target cover and on withdrawal to 4800-1721 loaving them at 1345 at 22,000’. Bomber formation good except lead group for out in front. 10 a/c of the 48th Sq and 4 a/c of the 49th were unable to catch rest of formation of Red Force and did not effect R/V with briefed bombers. 8 a/c short of fuel were forced to turn back at 4807-1532 at 1255A. 6 a/c made R/V with an unidentified formation of bombers at 1305 at 27,000’ at 4835-1605, 2 of these 6, carrying chaff, dropped ahead of the bombers for 20 seconds at 1313A 500’ above and 1/4 mile ahead of the bombers at 27,000’ on a heading of 153° at 200 MPH in the vicinity

of the target. 5 a/c furnished escort to WEINER NEUSTADT leaving the bombers at 1325A at 25,000’. 18 a/c of 37th Sq passed through briefed R/V 2 minutes early at 1214A and finding no bombers proceeded on toward next check point. At 4726-1445 they passed mixed groups of bombers. 3 a/c became separated at 4811-1431 at 1258 because of flak. Finally at 1306, unable to find 55th Wing 15 a/c picked up the two lead groups of the 304th Wing at 4842-1522 at 24000’, and escorted them through the target and on withdrawal as far as SIBENIK leaving them at 1417 at 20,000'. The 3 a/c that lost the formation continued on and picked up 1 group of the 49th Wing coming off the target at 4815-1702 at 1347 at 25000’. They escorted this group to 4412-1558 leaving them at 1455 at 13000’. 9 a/c of the 48th Sq proceeded alone and passed through briefed R/V at 1230 at 25000’. They made no contact there with bombers so proceeded on and made R/V at 1230 at 25000'. They made no contact there with bombers so proceeded on and made R/V with what appeared to be the 2nd wave of B-24s following the B-17s at 4800-1500 at 1300 at 25000’. Being low on fuel fighters left the bombers at 1310 at 250001 at 4830-1605.