

H I S T O R Y

OF THE

4 6 0 T H B O M B A R D M E N T G R O U P (H)

1 April 1945

to

30 April 1945

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Chain of Command:

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, U.S. Army

THROUGH: Commanding General, 55th Bombardment Wing (H), APO 520,
U.S. Army

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HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

(April 1 - 30, 1945)

NARRATIVE HISTORY

1. On Sunday, April 15, 1945, our Commander and Chief, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, four times chosen by the people as President of the United States, was committed to the earth of his beloved Hyde Park birthplace. On that same day the 460th Bomb Group paid respect in a religious service held for the President.

2. The final Allied blow for the liberation of Italy was struck on April 9. The 460th Bomb Group was dispatched to wipe out troop concentrations in the Po Valley in direct support of the 8th Army. This Group along with 1,000 aircraft of the 15th Air Force were assigned to attack the German Army in Italy. The same day our infantry started a push that was so violent it stunned the enemy. It was swift, sudden, and complete. In 22 days it ended the 22 months of bitter fighting that began when the Air Forces first attacked Italy and when the Fifth and Eighth Armies crossed the Mediterranean from Africa to Sicily.

The winter was a cruel period of waiting, but our aircraft pounded Jerry, his supply lines and his route of escape day after day, softening him up for the knock-out blow. On D-Day of the push to the Po - the final drive - the GIs got going, and they went like hell.

3. The following missions were led by the Group Commander, Deputy Group Commander, Group Operations Officer, Group Bombardier and Navigator.

COL. JOHN M. PRICE, GROUP COMMANDER

7 Apr. 1945	Mission Recalled
9 Apr. 1945	Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
10 Apr. 1945	Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
12 Apr. 1945	Ponte Di Piave RR Bridge, Italy
15 Apr. 1945	Enemy Positions SW Bologna, Italy
16 Apr. 1945	Enemy Positions SW Bologna, Italy
23 Apr. 1945	Padua Road Bridge (Red Force), Italy

LT. COL. JAMES C. WATKINS, DEPUTY GROUP COMMANDER

9 Apr. 1945	Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
10 Apr. 1945	Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
16 Apr. 1945	Enemy Position SW Bologna, Italy

23 Mar. 1945 Enemy Position SW Bologna, Italy

LT. COL. RAYFORD B. WHITLEY, GROUP OPERATIONS OFFICER

9 Apr. 1945 Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
10 Apr. 1945 Concentrations NW of Lugo, Italy
16 Apr. 1945 Enemy Position SW Bologna, Italy
25 Apr. 1945 Linz South Main M/Y, Austria

CAPTAIN FRANCIS L. SINCLAIR, GROUP NAVIGATOR

17 Apr. 1945 Enemy Position SW Bologna, Italy
21 Apr. 1945 Mission recalled over northern Italy
23 Apr. 1945 Padua Road Bridge (Red Force), Italy
24 Apr. 1945 Casarsa Diversion Bridge, Italy
25 Apr. 1945 Linz South Main M/Y, Austria

CAPTAIN LEO J. WILLISON, GROUP BOMBARDIER

16 Apr. 1945 Enemy Position SW Bologna, Italy
25 Apr. 1945 Linz South Main M/Y, Austria

4. The strength of the Group covering Officers and Enlisted men for the month of April was as follows:

At Beginning:	527	Officers	1953	Enlisted	Men
Net Increase:	47	"	141	"	"
Net Decrease:	-	"	-	"	"
At End	: 574	"	2094	"	"

5. During April thirty-three (33) new crews were assigned to the Group. Due to the greatly increased bombing activity, thirteen (13) combat crew members have finished their thirty-five (35) combat sorties and their present combat tour of duty.

6. Major Robert F. Hunt, Jr., 0341420, has been appointed Commanding Officer of Hq. Detachment vice Major Charles E. Holmes, Jr., 0296165. Major Holmes will assume the duties of Adjutant in the 762nd Bombardment Squadron.

7. In April 543 sorties were flown, of which 476 were effective sorties and 67 were non-effective sorties. A total of 1,270.09 tons of bombs were dropped on enemy targets.

8. The Group was free again this month from enemy fighter opposition. The amount of casualties for the month of April is as follows:

Killed in Action: 6 Officers 6 Enlisted Man

Missing in Action:	6	"	12	"	"
Wounded in Action:	2	"	7	"	"

9. The Group Gunnery School completed another unusually busy month.

537 men fired on the skeet range and expended 13,625 rounds of shot-gun ammunition.

956 men had training on the Jam-handly trainer.

At the Group Armament School 1,140 men were in attendance for this month.

937 men had instruction in turret Operation.

Four (4) turret mock-ups were in operation.

14 crews were indoctrinated in gunnery and combat tactics.

10. Officers and Enlisted Men continue to receive recognition for outstanding performance of duty in the air and on the ground.

Awards made during the period under review were as follows:

Silver Star	4
OLC to Silver Star	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	28
Bronz Star Medal	5
Air Medal	81
OLC to Air Medal	558

11. Work was completed on the offices for the Group Operations and Intelligence Sections.

12. The Group Dental Surgeon had another busy month. Following is a list of the work performed.

Fillings:	121
Extractions:	15
Gum Treatments:	5
Bridge Repairs:	2
Examinations:	305
Calculus removal & Prophylaxis:	6

13. Special Service Activities continued on a large scale during April. The redecoration of the Service Club and addition of the "snack bar" continues to keep the club a center of activity for all men.

Movies still hold the spotlight for entertainment. Two shows were held during April with an average attendance of four hundred (400) per showing.

Two U.S.O. show was held in which 1,000 men attended for each performance.

14. The Chaplain continued to keep busy with his many and varied activities. Total attendance at worship services was 1,375.

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ANNEX #1

B I O G R A P H I E S

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Major Franklin E. Reaves, Assistant Group Operations Officer.

Major Baxter H. Timberlake, Group Flight Surgeon.

Major Baxter H. Timberlake of 5414 Ventnor Ave., Atlantic City, N. J., is a graduate of Cary, N. C., High School, class of 1921, and Wake Forest College, class of 1926. He practiced medicine in Atlantic City until his entry into the Army Air Forces on August 1, 1942, at Davis Monthan Field, Arizona. He attended the school of Aviation Medicine at Randolph Field, Texas, and the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, Fla. And has been group flight surgeon of the 460th Bombardment Group since its activation.

He is a member of the Atlantic County Medical Society, the American Medical Society and the Aesculapius Club. His wife, Mrs. Mary C. Timberlake, resides at the Atlantic City address.

Major Franklin E. Reaves, 25, of 667 J. E. George Blvd., Omaha, Nebr., whose wife, Mrs. F. E. Reaves, resides at 5254 Ward Parkway, Kansas City, Mo., was recently promoted from the rank of captain. Major Reaves is the Assistant Group Operations Officer with a veteran B-24 Liberator heavy bombardment group of the 15th Air Force.

After graduation from Groves High School in 1937, he attended Washington University until his entry into the Army Air Forces on April 4, 1942, at Omaha. He received flight training at Clovis, N. Mexico.

Since his arrival in Italy, Major Reaves has been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal. In addition, he is entitled to wear the Distinguished Unit Badge and the European-African-Middle East campaign ribbon. His father, Mr. S. C. Reaves, resides at the Omaha address.

ANNEX#2

I N C I D E N T A L

P H O T O G R A P H S

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ANNEX #3

NARRATIVE MISSION

REPORTS AND

BOMB PLOT STRIKE PHOTOS

of

460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF

APO 520, U.S. ARMY

(April 1 - 30 1945)

TABULAR SUMMARY OF 20 MISSIONS

<u>MISSION NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
188	1 Apr.	Graz M/Y	Austria
189	2 Apr.	Graz M/Y	Austria
190	5 Apr.	Recalled (Weather)	Italy
191	7 Apr.	Recalled (Weather)	Italy
192	8 Apr.	Communications target	Italy
193	9 Apr.	Concentration NW of Lugo	Italy
194	10 Apr.	Concentration NW of Lugo	Italy
195	11 Apr.	Vipiteno M/Y	Italy
196	12 Apr.	Ponte Di Piave RR Bridge	Italy
197	14 Apr.	Ossopo M/Y Depot	Italy
198	15 Apr.	Enemy position SW Bologna	Italy
199	16 Apr.	Enemy position SW Bologna	Italy
200	17 Apr.	Enemy position SW Bologna	Italy
201	19 Apr.	Klagenfurt M/Y	Austria
202	20 Apr.	Rovigo-Adige RR Bridge, Ferrera	Italy
203	21 Apr.	Recalled (Weather)	Italy
204	23 Apr.	Padua Road Bridge (Red Force) Cavarzere Road Br (Blue Force)	Italy Italy
205	24 Apr.	Casarsa Diversion Bridge	Italy
206	25 Apr.	Linz South Main M/Y	Austria
207	26 Apr.	Klagenfurt M/Y	Austria

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #41, Operations Order #160.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 1 April 1945, at 0901 hours, thirty-two (32) scheduled B-24 a/c took off to bomb a communications target in AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Major Francis E. Barrett, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Captain Coleman O. Williams, 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 1006 hours.

3. The 460th departed ANDRIA at 1013 hours, the #3 group in the Wing formation.

4. Fighter escort was contacted by radio at 1145 hours at (4510N-1512E). At 1205 hours 15 P-51s were seen momentarily at (4530N-1510E). Escort were not seen in thick weather but radio contact was maintained until 1230 hours.

5. Two a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c #44-41072 turned back at 4200N-1620E) with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #44-50399 turned back during assembly with an oil leak. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

6. At 1215 hours at 4530N-1521E) a recall message was heard from one of the groups ahead. The 460th made a 180° turn to the left and started back to the base. However, a radio check with 55th Wing revealed that no recall had been given, the formation resuming course to the primary target at 1241 hours at (4548N-1510E). Weather was 10/10th.

a. At 1247 hours at (4610N-1503E) it was apparent the primary target would be cloud-obscured and could not be bombed visually as briefed. The Group then flew to GRAZ, AF Alt. #7, avoiding the MARIBOR flak defenses enroute. An IP was selected at (4655N-1608E) to meet the PFF navigator's request for a longer bomb run than originally planned.

7. Thirty a/c penetrated to AF Alt. #7, GRAZ M/Y:

a. 29 a/c dropped 72.25 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N and .01T fusing, on the target at 1328 hours from 25,500' on an axis of 299° T.H.

b. Photos show bombs of the first attack unit in the area just west of the Puch Werke. The second attack unit dropped in the barracks area about 7,000' SW of the M/Y. Heavy overcast precluded further assessment.

c. One a/c failed to bomb the target, jettisoning ten bombs at (4701N-1537E) in order to hold formation after losing two superchargers. One a/c had one bomb hung up because of a broken shackle and bomb was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

d. PFF navigator turned the formation on the bomb run by distance and bearing from the target. Two course corrections were given, and two sighting angles of 62° and 58° before the scope failed to give an accurate picture. The lead bombardier was never able to see the target and bombs were released on PFF rate with a dropping angle of 55°.

e. The PFF set of the leader of the second attack unit was shot out by flak while on the bomb run. The a/c was too badly damaged to permit another run. The bombardier hit the toggle switch just as the weather cleared revealing the target almost directly below.

f. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by the Group leader.

g. From GRAZ, course of the Group leader was to GRATENSTEIN, thence on the briefed route back to the base. Leader of the second attack unit, with his a/c damaged by flak, could not straighten out in time to reach rally point but flew to WOLFSBERG to LESE (4633N-1455E) to the base.

8. The Group experienced MAH flak over the target for three minutes. SAH flak was received from the CELJE Defenses at 4610N-1510E) for two minutes.

9. Three U/I silver SEFs were observed in the GRAZ area at 1327 hours, flying at 12,000'. E/a had sharply tapered wings and rounded wing tips.

10. Weather: on take off 2/10th stratocumulus, tops 4000' and 1/10th cirrus. 2/10th cirrus over ADRIATIC, bases 23000', and 2/10th thin altocumulus at 10000'. Cirrus slowly increased to 3/10th over YUGOSLAV coast and 5/10th over YUGOSLAV MTS, east of FIUME.

South of LJUSLJANA, cirrus increased rapidly to 10/10th, bases 21000', the formation climbing to 26000' without breaking out on top.

Over GRAZ 10/10th cirrus, bases and tops unknown.

On return, 10/10th cirrus had moed south of FIUME. Over YUGOSLAV coast 60-70 miles south of FIUME, cirrus broke slowly to 7/10th, bases 20000'. Generally clear over ADRIATIC except for 3/10th stratocumulus, tops 4000' over western ADRIATIC and SPUR.

Visibility generally 15-20 miles when not in clouds.

11. 29 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1539 and 1602. A/c #44-50400, the lead a/c of the second attack unit which was damaged by flak, landed at ZARA and the crew returned in another a/c of this Group.

12. The radio receiver on the lead a/c was poor but good contact was maintained within the Group through the deputy leader. Communication was excellent with the weather a/c.

13. Five a/c landing at this base had minor flak damage. There were no casualties.

14. Ten a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

15. Observations: 14 B-17s at 15000' on a heading of 355 passed under the Group formation on the bomb run at GRAZ at about 1323 hours. 350 cars in LJUBLJANA M/Y at 1352 hours, 23,000'.

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #42, Operations #162.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 2 April 1945, at 1015 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb the GRAZ M/Y in AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Captain Franklin E. Reaves, Assistant Group Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Captain Rual W. Davis, 760th Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was at ALTAMURA at 1110 hours. The 465th, leading, was at rendezvous on time but the second group, the 464th, was late, causing the third group, the 485th, and the 460th in #4 position, to dogleg in order to get in behind.

3. Wing rendezvous was effected over Spinazzola, the 460th departing at 1123½ hours.

4. Fighter escort, about 20 P-51s, first sighted at 1315 hours at (4545N-1624E), furnished good penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1430 hours at (4545N-1547E).

5. Thirty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target:

a. Thirty a/c dropped 72 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N and .01T fusing, at 1350 hours from 22,500' on an axis of 302° T.N.

b. Bomb strike photos show a heavy concentration in the north M/Y, with at least 30-40 hits causing damage to rolling stock and trackage. Other concentrations are seen in the north half of the south M/Y and at the junction just east of KOFMACHER F/Y.

c. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack leaders.

d. One a/c failed to bomb the target due to a rack malfunction. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC. One a/c accidentally jettisoned three bombs on the bomb run, and one a/c with nine bombs hung up by intervalometer failure, jettisoned immediately after the target.

6. The Group experienced MAH flak over the target. Bursts, black in color, tracked the formation for three minutes.

7. Briefed route was flown as closely as possible from #4 position until approaching the vicinity of ZAGREB where the 485th began sliding to the right, forcing the 460th to right of course. At the turning point just before the IP the 485th was about eight miles right of course. At this point the 460th turned back to the briefed route leading to the IP. At about (4641N-1549E) when the 485th began moving closer to the briefed route the 460th was forced to make a turn to the right around the briefed IP. An IP at (4653N-1550E) was good.

The city of GRAZ was easily identified but smoke from previous bombings caused difficulty in picking up the MPI.

Rally left to PAGE and the return to base was as briefed.

8. Weather: Generally clear on take off to YUGOSLAVIA with 1-2/10th high thin cirrus slowly increasing to the north.

Over target, CAVO except for 8/10th cirrus, bases 26-28000', above bombing altitude.

Return route similar with few cumulus over mountains.

Visibility 20-30 miles.

9. Thirty-one a/c returned to base between the hours of 1605 and 1640.

10. Communication was excellent within the Group on channel "a". It was unnecessary to call other group, escort, or weather a/c.

11. One a/c received major flak damage and seven a/c minor damage.

12. There were no reported casualties.

13. Ten a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations: a. One B-24 on ground at 1335 hours at (4551N-1608E) from 21,000'. No activity noted. B> 5-600 cars and 5 locos in SISAK M/Y and 7 barges in river at 1310 hours, 18500'. C. The word "OUCE" plowed out in large letters in field near ZAPPONETA, ITALY, (4129N-1556E), observed at 1600 hours from 5,600'.

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incl.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

6 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #43, Operations Order #167.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 5 April 1945 at 0910 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in ITALY. Another six a/c were dispatched at 0942 hours to bomb a flak position in the target area. The Group was led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Lt. Richard W. Harclerode, 761st Bomb Sqdn (H). The special force of six a/c was led by Captain Harlen R. Logan, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Due to local weather conditions Group take-off was at 0910 hours, forty minutes late. The special force of six a/c took off at 0942 hours.

3. Group assembly was then further delayed because of interference by the rendezvous of the 464th, 465th and 485th over the 460th's assembly area. The lead box of the Group and the lead box, second attack unit, were in position passing over SPINAZZOLA at 1020 hours, approximately eight minutes behind the 464th. The Baker and Dog boxes were then formed but not in proper position.

Before assembly was completed the Group received word that the 465th would be several minutes late. After executing a 360° turn to allow the 465th to come into position, the 460th fell in behind the 465th, assuming #4 position in the Wing.

Assembly was finally accomplished at 1039½ hours at (4130N-1521E).

4. Assembly of the special force of six a/c was delayed by weather with the result that departure over SPINAZZOLA at 1026 hours was forty-three minutes late. The 485th leader of the special force was contacted and it was determined that he could not be overtaken. With permission of the Wing ground station, the 460th special force then joined the 460th main group as Easy box at 1141 hours at (4315N-1250E).

5. Fighter escort, eight P-38s, were seen momentarily at 1240 hours at (4440N-0950E).

6. One a/c #44-49598 turned back at (4410N-1135E) with #2 supercharger failure. Bombs were returned to base.

7. At 1240 hours, on orders received from the 465th, the Group, with the special force (Easy box) attached, turned off course toward a last resort target.

a. At 1300 hours at (4404N-0921E) a recall order was received from the 465th and verified by the fighter escort.

b. At 1313 hours at (4333N-0853E), Wing Headquarters was contacted for verification of the recall. It was learned at this time that the recall had not come from Wing Headquarters. However, since weather conditions in the target area made it impossible to bomb visually as briefed, the Group continued on course to the base.

8. Thirty-two a/c returned bomb loads to base.

a. Due to engine failures, four a/c jettisoned bomb loads as follows:

- (1) 1 a/c, 10x500# RDX bombs in ADRIATIC at (4310N-1422E).
- (2) 1 a/c, 10x500# RDX bombs in LIGURIAN SEA at (4354N-0945E).
- (3) 1 a/c, 10x500# RDX bombs in LIGURIAN SEA at (4400N-1005E).
- (4) 1 a/c, 40x100# GP bombs in LIGURIAN SEA at (4203N-1030E).

9. Weather: on take off 8/10th stratocumulus, bases 2000' MSL and tops 3000'. Clouds broke rapidly to generally clear in the vicinity of PESCARA. Over APPENINES and central ITALY few scattered high cirrus and patchy stratocumulus, tops 6-8000'. Cirrus slowly increased to north and lowered to 17000', tops 25000', with 10/10th just north of FORMOVO.

Entire PO VALLEY to last resort target was covered by thick cirrus with a few widely scattered cumulus underneath.

On return down west coast, variable 2-4/10th cumulus along the coast to north of ROME, tops 8000'. Cumulus built up to 7/10th along mts south of ROME and across FOGGIA, tops 10 to 12000'.

Foggia to base, 7/10th cumulus, tops 6-8000'.

Visibility generally 15-20 miles.

10. Thirty-six a/c returned to base between the hours of 1502 and 1537.

11. Twelve a/c were equipped with cameras.

12. Communications: a. within the Group - good on channel "B".
b. with 465th - fair, but at times could not be reached. C. with 464th -
unsatisfactory. d. with 485th - unsatisfactory. e. with escort - fair.
f. with WX a/c - no contact attempted.

13. Observation: a. 4 possible Cas or CLs and 3 M/Ys in
anchorage at GENOA at 1250 hours from 22,000'.

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

1 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

8 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #44, Operations Order #171.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 7 April 1945, at 1040 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 type a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in Italy. The Group was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Captain Robert E. Reed, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly over the base was without incident at 1140 hours.

3. Departure over ANDRIA at 1148 hours was as briefed, the 460th leading the Wing. However, the 485th, which had arrived about two minutes early, cut across the course of the 460th during rendezvous. The 485th was then obliged to fly a dogleg to get into #2 position.

4. Fighter escort, eight P-51s, first sighted at 1405 hours at (4643N-1325E), furnished penetration and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1524 hours at (4513N-1440E).

5. Three a/c returned early:

a. A/c #44-49416 turned back at (4709N-1331E) with low oil pressure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #44-49512 turned back at (4515N-1455E) due to engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #44-49633 turned back at (4610N-1400E) with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

6. Twenty-eight a/c penetrated to (4730N-1220E) where at 1427 hours, a radio report from the 5th Wing ahead stated that they were returning because of weather in the target area. The Group was then at 23,500', flying over 10/10th undercast, tops 22,000'. Since it was evident that neither the primary target or alternatives could be bombed visually as briefed, the Group leader radioed the recall signal to the Wing and notified the 49th Wing.

a. The 28 a/c returned bomb loads (5x1000# RDX bombs, .1N-nodelayT fusing to base.

7. Weather: 7/10th altocumulus on take off, tops 15000', breaking to 4/10th over ADRIATIC with tops at 18000'. Over YUGOSLAVIA, altocumulus increased slowly to 10/10th in the vicinity of LJUBLJANA, tops to 20000'.

Rest of route to north of ALPS, tops rising to 22-23000' with high cirrus.

Over central ALPS and north ITALY, altocumulus tops appeared to rise to 35,000' with 10/10th over ALPS in all directions.

Return route was similar except altocumulus deck extended further south to vicinity of FIUME before breaking quickly to 7/10th and then slowly decreasing to 5/10th over ADRIATIC, bases 15000'.

Over ADRIATIC and ITALY, there were also scattered stratocumulus. Altocumulus increased to 8/10th over ITALY.

Visibility, generally twenty miles.

8. The briefed route was flown until reaching (4341N-1540E) at 1248 hours. Weather then forced the formation to the right of course, the following legs being flown: (4341N-1540E) to (4405N-1558E) to (4434N-1558E) to (4520N-1518E) to the briefed route at 4606N- 1400E). The briefed route was then flown to turning point at (4643N-1325E) where weather again forced the formation off course to (4715N-1300E) to (4730N-1220E).

From the recall point at (4730N-1220E), a reciprocal of the route was flown to (4643N-1325E) and from hereon the reciprocal of the briefed route was flown to the base.

9. 28 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1658 and 1718.

10. Radio communication was satisfactory with other groups of the 55th Wing, and with the 5th and 49th Wings. It was excellent within the Group on channel "B".

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

1 Incl.
Incl 1 - Track chart

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

9 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #45, Operations Order #172.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

I. On 8 April 1945, at 0815 hours, thirty (30) of thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in Italy. One a/c #42-52017 failed to take off due to flap indicator failure. The Group was led by Major Glenn D. Chamberlain, Air Inspector, and the second attack unit by Lt. Harold V. Byroads, 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group assembled over the base at 0915 hours without incident.

3. Rendezvous with the 485th was as scheduled, the 460th departing ANDRIA at 0923 hours.

4. Fighter escort, eight P-51s, first sighted at 1136 hours at (4646N-1421E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1241 at (4613N-1141E).

5. The Group consisting of thirty a/c penetrated to the primary target where a bomb run by boxes in trail was initiated.

a. The lead box consisting of seven a/c was unable to identify the target in time to synchronize and for this reason, five a/c did not bomb.

b. However, 25 a/c, including two a/c from the lead box, dropped 62.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the primary target from 1219 to 1222 hours from a mean altitude of 23,000' and mean heading of 190°. It is apparent from strike photos that one concentration of hits fell two miles north of FORTEZZA in the mts and another concentration fell two miles south of BRESSANONE cutting the rail line.

c. After rallying right off the primary target, the lead box went to the IP for AF Alt #1 and made a briefed bomb run. Five a/c dropped 12 tons of bombs at 1238 hours from 23,440' on a heading of 118° MH.

d. It was impossible to make positive identification of the primary target due to high mts on both sides of the target area. For this reason some doubt exists in attempting to pinpoint the bomb strikes for each box.

(1) No hits shown in strike photos on the FORTEZZA M/Y.

(2) No photos are available on AF Alt #1 but visual observations by crew members report a good concentration of hits on the briefed MPI of the bridge, ADIGE/MEZZOCORONA, ITALY.

e. Due to malfunctions, two a/c had three bombs hung up: 2 bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC and one bomb at (4615N-1050E).

f. Three box leaders used auto pilot on the bomb run, the leader of Dog Box used PDI due to engine trouble, intercommunication failure, and possible C-1 failure.

6. MIH flak was encountered 1½ minutes before the bomb release line for the primary target. Numerous white bursts were seen ahead and above the formation. The white smoke puffs were much smaller and more compact than the usual black which was also seen. After the bomb release line MAH flak was experienced for 2½ minutes.

During the attack on AF Alt #1, no flak was received prior to bombs away. While rallying left off the target, SAH flak, described as continuous pointed fire, was received for two minutes.

7. Route was flown as briefed to the primary target. Rally was as briefed. The Group leader contacted the other boxes in the Group and said his intentions were to bomb AF Alt #1. The other boxes having dropped their bombs continued on and flew the briefed route to base. The lead box after making its run on AF Alt #1, rallied left to CADRIA, thence to PRATA to (4536N-1253E), then direct to base.

8. Weather: on take off, 7/10th cirrostratus, bases 20 to 25000' and 1/10th altocumulus at 11000'.

On route, few patches of cirrus and cirrostratus with 10/10th stratocumulus over ZARA, tops 8000', extending over YUGOSLAVIA. Deck broke at LJUBLJANA to 2-4/10th patchy stratocumulus over ALPS. From KLAGENFURT to target, generally clear with visibility unlimited.

Over target, clear with visibility unlimited.

On return, clear to PO RIVER becoming 7-8/10th stratocumulus, tops 8000' south of LAKE TRASIMENC. At FLORENCE 8 to

10/10th cirrostratus deck, bases 20000' which extended to ANCONA.
Thence 4-6/10th increasing rapidly to 10/10th north of SPUR.

9. Thirty a/c returned to base between the hours of 1454 and 1537.

10. Two a/c received major flak damage and nine a/c received minor flak damage over the primary target. The co-pilot of one a/c, Lt. John L. Stallworth, was killed by flak, head wound and S/Sgt Arthur D. Richardson was wounded in the shoulder.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group	---	Fair on channel "B"
With 485th	---	Good
With 464th	---	Could not contact.
With 465th	---	Satisfactory
With Escort	---	Satisfactory
With wx a/c	---	No calls

12. Ten a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track chart

Incl 2 - Two photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

10 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #46, Operations Order #173.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 9 April 1945, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a military concentration NW of LUGO, ITALY, in direct support of the Eighth Army. RED Force, consisting of 21 a/c, took off at 1145 hours led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander. BLUE Force, consisting of 21 a/c took off at 1200 hours led by Lt. Colonel J.C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander.

2. Due to 7/10th cumulus clouds, both RED and BLUE forces experienced difficulty in assembling.

As a result, RED Force was late at the rendezvous point but this was made up by cutting across the SPUR and joining the Wing formation at (4235N-1500E) at 1400 hours on course for the Key Point.

BLUE Force individual boxes assembled over the ADRIATIC between BARLETTA and BARI, and then completed force assembly over ALTAMURA, falling in behind the 485th at 1317 hours on a line rendezvous from ALTAMURA to SPINAZZOLA.

3. Fighter escort, fifteen P-47s and thirty P-51s, first sighted at 1446 hours at (4412N-1223E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1503 hours at (4405N-1231E).

4. One a/c #44-41014 of RED Force, returned early due to oil pressure failure. Entire bomb load of 36 clustered frags was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4140N-1625E) at 1230 hours.

5. Forty-one (41) a/c penetrated to the primary target, the assigned MPI, M.319421 in "APPLE" area, being the same for both forces. A total of 82.47 tons was dropped as follows:

a. 20 a/c of RED Force dropped 42.87 tons of 36 clustered frags on M.319421 at 1453 hours from 21,800' on an axis of 306° TH.

b. 21 a/c of BLUE Force dropped 39.6 tons of 40-clustered 100-lb GP bombs, .1N-.01T fusing, on M.319421 at 1501 hours from 21,550' on an axis of 300° TH.

c. Bomb strike photos show an excellent concentration of both forces covering the briefed MPI, starting just short of the diagonal road and extending to the BANTERMO RIVER.

d. Crews reported that the IP was easily picked up. The identification panels, smoke generators, and friendly flak signals were clearly seen on the bomb run, and the radio frequency beams were used effectively by lead a/c.

6. Five a/c of RED Force and seven a/c of BLUE Force jettisoned bombs.

a. One a/c after the rally had two hanging bombs (100 lb GP) fall through the closed bomb bay doors at 1524 hours at (4354N-1242E) in friendly territory.

b. The following summary gives time and place of all bombs accidentally or otherwise jettisoned by RED and BLUE Forces:

(1) RED Force

One a/c - 6 frags at (4440-1315) at 1523 hours.
One a/c - 12 frags at (4405-1315) at 1515 hours.
One a/c - 12 frags at (4007-1242) at 1512 hours.
One a/c - 3 frags at (4404-1242) at 1510 hours.
One a/c - 216 frags at (4140-1625) at 1230 hours (See Par#4)

(2) BLUE Force

One a/c - 10 bombs at (4427-1153) at 1501 hours.
One a/c - 2 bombs at (4410-1243) at 1528 hours.
One a/c - 6 bombs at (4403-1257) at 1523 hours.
One a/c - 2 bombs at (4357-1256) at 1534 hours.
One a/c - 2 bombs at (4402-1257) at 1534 hours.
One a/c - 20 bombs between (4350-1320)-(4345-1320) at 1540 hours.
One a/c - 4 bombs at 4405-1327) at 1543 hours & 2 bombs dropped through doors at (4354-1242) at 1524 hours (See Par #6a.)

7. Flak in target area was SIH, experienced for two minutes. A probable six-gun battery was observed firing near MASSA LOMBARDA (4427N-1149E) at 1455 hours.

8. Enroute, RED Force cut inside the overwater turning point to (4235N-1500E) to overtake Wing formation, then flew briefed course to target. On return, this force turned short of briefed rally point and headed directly back to the ADRIATIC above RIMINI to permit immediate disposition of hung bombs. Turning south over water, course from vicinity of ANCONA to the base was as briefed.

BLUE Force flew the briefed course enroute and on return.

9. Weather: 7/10th cumulus on take off, bases 3000', tops 6-7000', breaking to nil over ADRIATIC. From ITALIAN coast 6-8/10th cumulus, tops 6-7000' as far north as RIMINI.

RIMINI to the north, cumulus broke slowly to nil over target.

Return route was similar except for 4/10th cumulus at base on return.

Visibility 15-20 miles.

10. Forty-one a/c returned to base between the hours of 1656 and 1722.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group -- Poor in RED, good in BLUE Force.
With 485th -- Satisfactory in RED, good in Blue.
With UPHILL -- Excellent with BLUE.
No other communications.

12. One a/c of BLUE Force received minor flak damage. There were no reported casualties.

13. 18 a/c, nine of each force, attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations: On the bomb run all identification procedures, as explained in Para #5d., were clearly visible.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

11 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #47, Operations Order #174.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 10 April 1945, at 0915hours, forty-one (41) of forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb Military Concentrations NW of LUGO, ITALY, in direct support of the British Eighth Army. One a/c #44-50399, did not take off because of electrical failure. The Group was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Lt. Colonel J.C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander.

2. Group assembly was over the base and departed SPINAZZOLA at the briefed time of 1034 hours at 14,000', but the 464th, leading, and the 465th, #2 in the Wing formation, had departed three minutes early. This interval was closed between the Key Point and IP as a result of a dog-leg to the right made by the 465th. The 460th was then able to assume its proper position at 1153 hours at (4352N-1323E).

3. No fighter escort was seen on the mission.

4. Forty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target, dropping 88.32 tons of clustered frags on the MPI, M.298420, in the "BAKER" area, at 1215½ hours from 21,500' on an axis of 301°.

a. Bomb strike photos show a heavy and close concentration of bombs from both attack units on the assigned target, the pattern starting at the aiming point and covering the briefed MPI.

b. Both attack unit leaders used auto pilot on the bomb run.

c. All planned target identification procedures were effective.

d. Enroute one a/c lost three frags over the ADRIATIC at (4218N-1553E) at 1105 hours.

e. Three a/c had 24 frags hung up due to malfunctions, jettisoning as follows:

1 a/c - 6 frags at (4423N-1150E) at 1219 hours.

1 a/c - 12 frags at (4405N-1246E) at 1225 hours.

1 a/c - 6 frags at (4409N-1242E) at 1245 hours.

5. The Group experienced MAH flak over the target for 2½ minutes. Bursts were black except for one orange burst observed shortly before bombs away.

6. Enroute the Group flew five to eight miles left of briefed course to overtake the 465th which had departed early. Near the Key Point, as explained in para #2, the 465th dog-legged to allow the 460th to come into proper position. Route back was as briefed except for a turn left just inside rally point to reach the ADRIATIC as soon as possible to dispose of fouled or hung up bombs.

7. Weather: clear on take off and enroute to the target with 2-4/10th cumulus along the ITALIAN coast.

Target, CAVU.

On return, weather same as course out, with base clear.

8. Forty-one (41) a/c returned to base between the hours of 1400 and 1441.

9. One a/c received major flak damage and nine a/c minor damage. There were no reported casualties.

10. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Satisfactory.
With 485th	-- Satisfactory.
With 464th	-- Satisfactory.

11. 17 a/c attempted photos. Selected strike photos are attached.

12. Observations: Front line "T" identification panels were still east of SENIC RIVER at 1213 hours, observed from 21,500'. On bomb run continuous calling of word "Charlie" was not heard on B channel VHF from 1214 to 1218 hours, 21,500'.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

12 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #48, Operations Order #175.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 11 April 1945, at 0750 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in ITALY. The Group was led by Major Glenn E. Chamberlain, Air Inspector, and the second attach unit by Lt. Vahan Karderian, 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0841½ hours.

3. The 460th was on course over ANDRIA at 0850 hours and rendezvous with the 485th was completed at (4200N-1620E) at 0911 hours with the 460th in #2 position.

4. Fighter escort, sixteen P-51s, first sighted at 1107 hours at (4636N-1414E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1243 hours at (4540N-0958E).

5. Three a/c returned early:

a. A/c #44-41336 turned back at (4629N-1422E) with #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4315N-1546E).

b. A/c #44-49889 turned back at (4719N-1248E) with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4700N-1320E).

c. A/c #44-41014 turned back at (4713N-1300E) with #2 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned at (4703N-1306E).

6. 28 a/c penetrated to the area of the primary target and a bomb run of 126° was initiated. However, two and a half minutes after leaving the IP, the target was seen to be smoke obscured from previous bombings. At the same time, the assigned first alternate, AF Alt #2, VIPITENO M/Y, was clearly visible. The Group leader therefore turned on a heading of 141° for AF ALT #2.

a. The bombing formation was boxes in trail. During the turn, however, Charlie Box moved in behind Able Box, Baker Box took 3rd place, with Dog Box following in it's assigned position.

b. 28 a/c dropped 69.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N-NDY T fusing, on VIPITENO M/Y at 1210½ hours from 24,500' on an axis of 141° T.H.

c. Bomb strike photos show two excellent concentrations in M/Y, with both choke points well covered. At least 15 hits in NW end of yards and 15 to 20 hits in SE portion, caused damage to tracks and rolling stock. There were 5 hits in the warehouse area.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all box leaders.

e. One a/c had one bomb hung up over the target which was returned to base.

7. The Group experienced MAH flak over the target. The lead elements received SIH before bombs away while the middle and rear elements received MAH from two minutes before bomb release until two minutes after.

8. The route was flown as briefed, except that upon reaching LJUBLJANA at 1052 hours, the 460th flew directly to KLAGENFURT thence to ZELL-AM-SEE to avoid flak previously reported by crews in the TARVISIC area.

9. Weather: clear on take off, visibility 12 miles.

On route, few patchy thin stratus over ADRIATIC and YUGOSLAVIA. 2-3/10th cirrus began at ALPS, bases at 25000' and continued west to target. Cirrus increased to east and NE of ALPS.

Over target, 3-5/10th cirrus, bases estimated at 25000'.

Visibility variously estimated from 15-40 miles.

Similar weather on return route.

10. 26 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1451 and 1539 hours.

a. A/c #8977 crash-landed at Florence A/D. Crew was reported as safe by Wing TWX.

b. A/c #1187 is missing, believed lost as a result of flak damage received a few seconds before bombs away. A distress signal from this a/c followed by a report that crew would have to bail out, was heard over radio by another a/c in formation at (4430N-1040E) at 1312 hours. At 1315 hours at about (4435N-1030E), a B-24, believed to be a/c #1187, was observed going down, left wing on fire. Seven chutes were seen opening.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group -- Good.
With 485th -- Good.
With escort -- Very good.

12. Three a/c received major flak damage and thirteen a/c minor damage. One crew member was wounded in the right foot by flak.

13. Ten a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - Photos.

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

13 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #49, Operations Order #177.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, U.S. Army.

1. On 12 April 1945, at 0800 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb the PONTE DI PIAVE RR BRIDGE, ITALY. The Group was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Lt. Ovie C. Mensinger, 760th Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0854 hours without incident.

3. No Wing rendezvous was scheduled. The 460th was on course over ANDRIA at 0902 hours. An unusually strong tail wind resulted in the Group departing two minutes early despite a dogleg taken between the base and ANDRIA in an attempt to offset the wind.

4. Fighter escort was not sighted. Because of adverse weather, 8-10/10th altostratus with tops 18-20,000', the Group was seventeen minutes late at fighter rendezvous. Escort was notified by radio.

5. The Group, consisting of 31 a/c, penetrated to the primary target where a visual bomb run was initiated with boxes bombing in trail.

a. 30 a/c dropped 75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs and 52,500 leaflets on the target at 1217 hours from 20,000' on an axis of 206° T.H.

b. Eight 500 lb RDX bombs per a/c were fused .1N&.01T, while two per a/c were fused 1-72 hours long delay. Five a/c carried leaflet bombs, each containing 10,500 leaflets.

c. Bomb strike photos show bridge cut near north end by direct hits. Northern approach to bridge was well covered, with apparent destruction of tracks. Other near misses probably caused additional damage to bridge structure.

d. Box leaders used auto pilot on the bomb run with the exception of Baker leader who used PDI when C-1 failed on the bomb run.

e. One a/c had ten RDX bombs hung up which were disposed of as follows:

(1) The two long delay bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4236N-1517E) at 1335 hours. Nose fuses were inserted causing these bombs to explode as they hit the water.

(2) One hanging bomb, that had been unarmed and made safe, fell through the bomb bay doors at 1404 hours in field at (4125N-1545E) NE of highway between FOGGIA and CERIGNOLA.

(3) The a/c then turned back to the ADRIATIC jettisoning the seven remaining bombs at (4140N-1630E) at 1415 hours.

6. No flak was encountered on the mission.

7. The briefed route was followed to Key Point, then because of weather course was changed to (4643N-1405E) to 4716N-1345E) to briefed turning point of (4643N-1317E). On return except for short leg to avoid plotted flak area on NORTH ADRAITIC coast, course was as briefed.

8. Weather: 3/10th high cirrus on take off with similar conditions over ADRIATIC and YUGOSLAV coast. Thirty miles south of LJUBLJANA, formation encountered altocumulus, bases 16000', rapidly increasing to 8-10/10th from LJUBLJANA to well north of ALPS. Formation climbed through weather south of KLAGENFURT, tops 18 to 20000', with 3/10th high cirrus.

To SW into PO VALLEY, middle deck broke slowly to 5/10th and then abruptly to 2/10th in target area, tops 15-16000' with 3/10 cirrus above.

On return, 8-10/10th altocumulus, tops 20,000' over ADRIATIC extending to ANCONA area with tops lowering slowly to 16000'. From ANCONA, altocumulus broke rapidly to clear with 3-5/10th high cirrus.

Visibility generally 10-15 miles.

9. Thirty-one a/c returned to base between the hours of 1405 and 1432.

10. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Satisfactory.
With 485th	-- Satisfactory.
With 464th	-- Satisfactory.

11. No a/c was damaged by flak and there were no reported casualties.

12. Ten a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

13. Observation: 5 transport a/c and 25 SEFs on REVEREDO /D (4602N-1236E) at 1207 hours, observed from 20,000'.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Track Chart

Incl 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

15 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #50, Operations Order #180.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, U.S. Army (Attn: A-2).

1. On 14 April 1945, at 0800 hours, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in NORTH ITALY. The Group was led by Major D.L. Cushing, C.O., 760th Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Lt. H.V. Byroads, 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0830 hours without incident.

3. No Wing rendezvous was scheduled. The 460th departed ANDRIA at 0858 hours, as briefed, the third group in the Wing.

4. Fighter escort, 26 P-38s, first sighted at 1033 hours at (4415N-1341E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left the formation at 1213 hours at (4452N-1332E).

5. Thirty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target, OSSOPO M/T DEPOT, ITALY, where a visual bomb run with boxes in trail was initiated:

a. 24 a/c dropped 59.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .01N & NDY T fusing, on the primary target at 1135 hours from 20,000' on an axis of 275° T.

b. Baker box, unable to synchronize in time on the primary target, with-held it's bombs. This box circled to make another run then, notified that the primary had been well hit, flew to KLAGENFURT SE M/Y, a briefed target of opportunity, where seven a/c dropped 16.5 tons of bombs at 1210 hours from 20,200' on and axis of 110° T.

c. Bomb strike photos of the primary target, OSSOPO M/T DEPOT, show good concentrations on the target and in northern end of barracks area. Haze and smoke from fires prevent detailed assessment of damage.

d. Strike photos taken by Baker box at KLAGENFURT SE M/Y are cloud obscured but bombs away pictures show bombs heading for the target area.

e. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by all box leaders.

- f. Three a/c had five bombs hung up over the targets:
- (1) One a/c of Able box jettisoned one bomb at (4618N-1348E).
 - (2) One a/c of Baker box jettisoned three bombs at (4611N-1344E).
 - (3) Another a/c of Baker box jettisoned one bomb at (4628N-1425E).

6. No flak was encountered on this mission.

7. Route enroute was as briefed except for "S" turns made between Key Point and Control Point to obtain longer interval between groups. Purpose of longer interval was to avoid possibility of target being smoke-obscured from previous bombings on arrival.

Return route was as briefed except for Baker box which made a right turn off the primary target then flew to a selected IP at (4647N-1344E) to make its bomb run on KLAGENFURT. From a rally to the right at KLAGENFURT this box took an average heading of 175° for the base to avoid weather and flak areas.

8. Weather: on take off 3/10th thin stratocumulus and 3/10 altostratus at 16000'. Middle clouds decreased to nil of the Spur but stratocumulus increased to 8/10th, tops 8000' with 4/10th cirrus above.

Stratocumulus decreased slowly across ADRIATIC to 5/10th over YUGOSLAVIAN coast, tops 10-12000', with 3/10th cirrus. Cumulus decreased slowly on remainder of route becoming 3/10th in target area, with tops 8000', bases 4000'.

On return route, generally clear over NORTH ADRIATIC but cumulus increased rapidly toward the south, becoming 8/10, tops 8000', in the ANCONA area, and 8/10th throughout rest of route to the base, tops 8000', bases 4000'.

Visibility generally 15-20 miles.

9. 31 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1346 and 1418.

10. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Excellent on channel "B".
With 485 th	-- Satisfactory.
With 464 th	-- Satisfactory.

11. Ten a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected prints are attached.

12. Observations: a. Tremendous explosion and fire about 5 miles NE of GORIZIA on east bank of ISONZO RIVER near GARGARO (4600N-1340E); observed from 20,000' at (4611N-1343E) at 1128 hours. No a/c seen in that vicinity at time of explosion. B. 13SEF & TEF on ROVEREDO A/D (4603N-1236E) at 1140 hours observed from 19000'. 2 freighters and 35 small craft in north and south harbors at ORSERA (4508N-1337E) at 1206 hours observed from 16000'.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
GroupS-2

2 Incls.

- 1 - Track chart
- 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

16 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #51, Operations Order #181.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 15 April 1945, Fifty-one (51) or Fifty-three (53) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched as a RED and a BLUE Force, to bomb different targets in NORTH ITALY.

2. RED Force, consisting of forty-one a/c, took off at 1020 hours and was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander, the second attack unit being led by Lt. Colonel J.C. Watkins, Deputy Commander.

3. Because of 9/10th stratocumulus on take off, bases 2000', tops 6-7000', RED Force was compelled to assemble over water near BARLETTA rather than in the normal area. This formation then flew to SPINAZZOLA departing the base at 1149 hours at an altitude of 12,000'.

4. Fighter escort, ten P-38s, first sighted at 1348 hours at (4324N-1052E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. The escort was last seen at 1440 hours at (4333N-1019E).

5. Two a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c #42-52372 returned early with two superchargers out. 37 bombs were jettisoned at (4303N-1014E) and 3 bombs at (4250N-0955E).

b. A/c #44-49702, RED Force leader, turned off the bomb run at 1404 hours at (4415N-1105E) with a cylinder in #4 engine blown. Bombs were jettisoned at (4325N-1000E).

6. Thirty-nine a/c of RED Force penetrated to the primary target, enemy position in area MA-5, Southwest of BOLOGNA, ITALY. A visual bomb run was made by attack units.

a. 30 a/c dropped 74.2 tons of 40-clustered 100 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on two MPIs, L.808380 & L.806376 in area MS-5, at 1409 hours from 21,000' on an axis of 25° T.

b. On the bomb run the RED Force leader was forced to drop out because of failure in #4 engine and the deputy lead piloted by Major Francis E. Barrett, took over about 3½ minutes before bombs away. The auto pilot was set up. At first neither the bombardier nor the nose

navigator could see the target because of cloud conditions. The clouds then broke and a visual run of about two minutes was made.

c. Bomb strike photos show a thorough and concentrated pattern of bombs from both attack units covering the briefed target area.

d. Auto pilot was used by both attack unit leaders on the bomb run.

e. Eight a/c had 76 bombs hung up over the target: Two bombs of one a/c dropped through the closed bomb bay doors over enemy territory at (4425N-1104E) two minutes after target, and 74 bombs were jettisoned in the LIGURIAN SEA.

7. No flak was encountered on the mission. Four bursts of white flak at 25,000' were observed in the BOLOGNA area.

8. The route to the target and return was flown as briefed except for minor deviations necessitated by towering cumulus.

9. Weather: on take off, 9/10th stratocumulus, bases 2000', tops 6-7000'. Clouds broke gradually toward ROME becoming clear over water. 2-3/10th cumulus appeared again over land and continued to target, tops 10,000'.

On return, 2-4/10th cumulus with some tops to 15,000' increasing to 6-7/10th at base, bases 4000', tops 8000'.

10. Thirty-nine a/c of RED Force returned to base between the hours of 1643 and 1710.

11. One a/c received slight damage, two small holes in wing, believed to be from gunnery test firing of another a/c.

12. Radio communications within the Group and with the 485th were satisfactory but unsatisfactory with the 464th and 465th.

13. Twelve a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations: Crew of the deputy lead a/c, which led the force on the bomb run, reported that the smoke and triangular panel at the IP, and the white "O" shaped panel near the front lie were clearly visible. The friendly flak line was considered an excellent guide.

The radio beam was effective.

The yellow panels on the bomb run and the red panels near the front line could not be seen.

15. Ten (10) of twelve (12) scheduled a/c of BLUE Force took off at 0920 hours to bomb a target in NORTH ITALY. The Force was led by Major Glenn L. Chamberlain, 761st Bomb Sqdn (H). One a/c #44-50417 failed to take off because of defective exhaust manifold and one a/c #42-51492 because of generator failure.

16. The BLUE Force assembled and departed over SPINAZZOLA at 1007 hours, one minute late due to a swing to the right in order to assume briefed position behind the 485th.

17. Fighter escort, 25-30 P-51s, first sighted at 1216 hours at (4416N-0920E), provided close penetration, target and withdrawal cover. The escort left the formation at 1335 hours at (4615N-1205E).

18. One a/c #41-50656 was lost after take off. According to a telephone message from Wing, this a/c crashed near GIOIA after the full crew of nine men had bailed out. One man, name and position unknown, was reported dead. No other information is available at this time.

19. BLUE Force did not penetrate to the primary target because of a radio message received at (4615N-1207E) reported this target obscured by weather making a visual run impossible.

20. The Force of nine a/c proceeded to the briefed second alternate, AF Alt #4, PONTE DI PIAVE RR Diversion, where a visual run was made with boxes in trail.

a. 7 a/c dropped 17.25 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the target at 1343½ hours from 24,000' on an axis of 206° T.

b. Bomb strike photos show the main concentration was on the southern road approach and on the south end of the RR bridge causing damage to both. One string of bombs ran across the south end of the diversionary RR bridge with one hit and two near misses on the south approach.

c. Because of weather conditions and lack of time for course corrections, box leaders used PDI on the bomb run.

d. Two a/c failed to bomb the target: One a/c dur to cloud coverage had insufficient time to synchronize on the target and returned bomb load to base. One a/c with a broken linkage in salvo handle, jettisoned 9 bombs at (4630N-1312E) and one bomb at (4508N-1325E).

e. One a/c had one bomb hung up which was jettisoned at (4543N-1247E) immediately after target.

21. No flak was encountered by the BLUE Force on the mission.

22. The briefed route was flown to the Key Point, then from (4615N-1207E) the force flew to the IP at (4608N-1225E). The return home was as briefed.

23. Weather: BLUE Force reported 8/10th stratocumulus on take off, bases 2000', tops 5-6000', decreasing to 4/10th over ROME, tops 8000', and 3/10th cirrus, bases 25,000'. Over water 2/10th cumulus and 6/10th cirrus with bases 29-30,000', continuing to GULF of GENOA. Over land, 2/10th cumulus with cirrus increasing to 8/10th at BOLOGNA.

PO VALLEY generally clear save for scattered cumulus. Stratocumulus overcast on south slope of ALPS, tops 10,000', breaking to 5/10th over target area, tops 12000', with 5/10th cirrus at 30,000'.

On return, no low clouds over east coast but thick haze over water. 5-7/10th stratocumulus north of SPUR and to base, bases 4000', tops 8000'.

Visibility generally 15 miles except over coastal areas.

24. Nine a/c of BLUE Force returned to base between the hours of 1544 and 1550.

25. Radio communications: BLUE Force leader's radio was operating poorly and contact with the 485th was made through the deputy.

26. Five a/c of BLUE Force were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

For the Commanding Officer:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

- 1 - 2 Track chart
- 2 - 3 Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

17 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #52, Operations #182.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 16 April 1945, at 0930 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a tactical target SW of BOLOGNA in direct support of the U.S. Fifth Army. The Group was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Major Francis E. Barrett of the 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 1030 hours.

3. The 460th could not fall in behind the 485th, Wing leader over ALTAMURA because of interference from another group. However Wing rendezvous was completed as briefed over SPINAZZOLA at 1057 hours with the 460th in the #2 position.

4. Fighter escort, 12 P-51s, first sighted at 1310 hours at (4356N-1055E), furnished good penetration, target and withdrawal cover. The escort left the formation at 1337½ hours at (4359N-1032E).

5. Three a/c failed to reach the primary target:

a. A/c #44-41050 turned back during rendezvous with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #42-51492 turned back during rendezvous with #3 cowl flap inoperative. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #42-64361 turned back in the assembly area with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

6. Thirty-nine a/c penetrated to the primary target where a visual run by attack units was started from the briefed IP on an axis of 24°. It was difficult to pick up the target area because of an undercast of 8/10th stratocumulus and altocumulus, tops 11,000'. As a result the Group was off course to the right about half a mile until about two miles before the target when the first attack unit, sighting the target momentarily, made a sharp turn to the left to a heading of 000°. The second attack unit was unable to identify the target at any time.

a. 19 a/c of the first attack unit dropped 42.375 tons of 18-clustered 250 lb GP bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the target area ST-13 and 14, at 1323 hours from 22,000' on an axis of 000° T.

b. Bomb strike photos show the target largely obscured by clouds. Small concentrations can be seen about 7,000 feet north of the assigned MPIs.

c. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by the Group leader.

d. One a/c of the first attack unit dropped 17 bombs on the target, one bomb having fallen on the taxi strip at the base before take off.

e. One a/c, unable to identify the target, returned bomb load to base.

f. One a/c had two bombs hung up which were jettisoned in the LIGURIAN SEA at (4305N-1012E).

7. The second attack unit consisting of 19 a/c was unable to identify the target due to adverse weather, and with-held its bombs.

a. 15 a/c returned bomb loads to the base, three a/c jettisoned in the LIGURIAN SEA and one a/c jettisoned in the DARIATIC before landing.

8. Route to and from the target was flown as briefed.

9. Weather: on take off 6-7/10th altocumulus, bases 11000', and 1-2/10th stratocumulus, bases 2000', tops 5000'. Clouds continued over APPENINES with altostratus-altocumulus increasing to 8-9/10th, and then breaking to nil in ROME area and over water. 5-7/10th stratocumulus-altocumulus, tops 11-12000', inland over northern slopes of APPENINES.

8/10th stratocumulus-altocumulus in target area, tops 11000', and 2/10th cirrus at 25,000'. Visibility 15 miles in haze.

On return, similar weather with heavy haze over water. 5/10th cumulus east of ROME increasing to 10/10th, tops 14000' over mountains. 4-6/10th stratocumulus, bases 3-4000', tops 6 to 8000' and 2-4/10th altostratus-altocumulus at 12-13000', on return.

Visibility generally 15 miles.

10. Thirty-nine a/c returned to base between the hours of 1544 and 1614.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group -- Excellent.
Within Wing -- Good.
With escort -- Good.
Unable to contact Wx a/c, or VHF forward radio control station: "PINGPONG".

12. 17 a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected photos are attached.

13. Observations: Group leader reported that the IP markings, the friendly flak signals, and the "V" beams were very effective. Panels near the flak line could not be seen.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

18 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #199, Operations #183.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 17 April 1945, at 1000 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb tactical targets in areas ST-11 and ST-12 SW of BOLOGNA, ITALY, in direct support of the U.S. Fifth Army. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel J.C. Watkins, Deputy Group Commander, and the second attack unit by Major John H. Joyce, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 1115 hours without incident.

3. The Wing departed SPINAZZOLA at 1147 hours with the 460th leading, followed by the 485th, 465th and 464th in close group column.

4. Fighter escort consisting of three P-51s was seen momentarily at (4426N-1115E) in the target area at 1403 hours.

5. A/c #44-49315 turned off the bomb run at (4417N-1107E) at 1358½ hours with #1 engine failure. The bomb load was jettisoned in the LIGURIAN SEA at (4350N-1008E).

6. Forty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target where a visual run by attack units was initiated from the briefed IP.

a. Ground haze and smoke from previous bombing made it difficult for the Group bombardier to identify the assigned target area until late in the bomb run when a sharp turn left was made toward the briefed MPI. Lacking time to synchronize, the lead a/c with-held its bombs with the intention of making another run. However, the Deputy lead bombardier, having picked up the target, released his bombs, the remainder of the 1st attack unit dropping on the Deputy. The 2nd attack unit dropped on its unit leader.

b. 39 a/c dropped 87.25 tons of 250 lb GP bombs, .1N&.025T fusing, on the assigned target areas, ST-11 and ST-12, at 1403 hours from 19,000' on an axis of 25°.

c. Bomb strike photos show the target areas well covered, with the pattern extending to the north and west.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by both attack leaders.

e. One a/c accidentally released 18 bombs at 1358 hours over enemy territory at (4424N-1114E). The bombs were seen to explode 1½ miles west of PRADURO. This a/c had opened bomb-bay doors and placed handle in select position over the LIGURIAN SEA. Rack switches were not turned on until one minute after the "V" beam was passed, at which time bombs fell away.

One a/c, as explained in paragraph 6a., failed to identify the target in time and bombs were not released. This a/c jettisoned 12 bombs in the LIGURIAN SEA at (4302N-1015E) at 1437 hours and returned 6 bombs to base.

One a/c had four bombs hung up over the target that were later jettisoned in the LIGURIAN SEA at (4309N-1014E).

7. No flak was encountered on the mission. SIH flak, 10-15 bursts, was observed at SASSUOLO (4432N-1047E).

8. Enroute course was flown as briefed but due to changes in the forecast winds, the Wing arrived at the Key Point seven minutes early. However, since the preceding Wing and the lead Wing in the Air Force formation both acknowledged being ahead of schedule it was decided that no change in airspeed or course was necessary.

Return was as briefed except that a straight course was flown from MONTIEVISTO to ISLE of ELBA to prevent collision with another group which had pulled up over the right wing of the 460th.

9. Weather: clear on take off to the APPENINES except for low haze which thickened slightly in western portion of mountains. Forty miles east of ROME, patchy stratocumulus and scattered small cumulus at 6000'. Clear to PIOMBINO where small area of patchy stratocumulus was again encountered. From PIOMPINO to target area, clear.

Over target, scattered small cumulus and 2/10th thin high cirrus.

On return, clear to south of ELBA and MONTECRISTO area where 7/10th thin stratus bank was observed. Inland scattered cumulus, tops 10000', over western portion of APPENINES. Few scattered cirrus over base.

Visibility generally 20-30 miles enroute and lowering to 10-15 miles in haze on return.

10. Forty-one a/c returned to base between the hours of 1622 and 1653.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group -- Excellent.
With 485th -- Fair.
With 464th -- Excellent.
With 465th -- Fair.
With escort -- Good.
With "PINGPONG" -- Unsatisfactory.

12. Seventeen a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

13. Observations: Group leader reported that the triangle and smoke net at the IP, friendly flak, the white "O" and "X", and the radio beam, were effective aids. Panels at the flak line were not seen.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

20 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #200, Operations #185.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 19 April 1945, at 0745 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Major D.L. Cishing, C.O., 760th Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Major J.R. Joyce, C.O., 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 0835 hours without incident.

3. The 460th, in #4 position, was one and a half minutes late for Wing rendezvous, departing ANDRIA at 0856½ hours. The 485th, in #3 position, was about four minutes early but doglegged enroute until 0917 hours at (4200N-1620E) when proper formation was accomplished.

4. Fighter escort consisting of four P-51s was seen momentarily at 1137 hours at (4645N-1303E). Escort made one sweep over the formation and was not seen again.

5. Two a/c returned early:

a. A/c #42-51881 turned back during assembly over the base, its nose turret damaged by collision with a flock of birds. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #42-52053 turned back at (4400N-1405E) after losing the formation in a deck of 9/10th altocumulus clouds. Bombs were returned to base.

6. Forty a/c penetrated to the IP of the primary target but an almost solid undercast of 9/10th low clouds at 12,000' which extended from the ALPS northward, made it impossible to bomb the primary or alternate targets by visual means as briefed. The formation then flew to KLAGENFURT where a visual bomb run on the M/Ys was made by attack units.

a. 32 a/c dropped 79.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N and .01T fusing, on the KLAGENFURT M/Ys at 1228 ½ hours from 20,000' on an axis of 210°.

b. Bomb strike photos show hits in center of north M/Y and center of west M/Y, causing damage to rolling stock and tracks. The main pattern extends west of the north M/Y.

c. On the bomb run, the lead bombardier of the second attack unit synchronized on the central section of the M/Ys but after killing course and rate, found that a malfunction of the sight gyro had thrown him off course without sufficient time for corrections. The seven a/c of lead (Dog) box, second attack unit, withheld bombs for a second run. However, when it was learned that Easy and Fox boxes had dropped on the target, Dog box returned its bombs to the base.

(1) One a/c of Easy box, second attack unit, did not drop due to being off course. Bombs were returned to base.

(2) One a/c had one bomb hung up due to a defective shackle and a/c jettisoned bomb in the ADRIATIC at (4446N-1334E).

d. The Group leader used auto pilot on the bomb run.

7. No flak was encountered on this mission.

8. Briefed route was flown to (4400N-1400E), then from Key Point at (4543N-1310E) to IP for primary target where cloud formation covered the entire area. Return was from (4725N-1400E) to target at KLAGENFURT to (4541N-1412E) to (4457N-1325E) to base.

9. Weather: clear on take off to north of SPUR where a 7-9/10th altocumulus deck was met, bases 9000', tops 15000'. Formation was in clouds until just south of north ITALIAN coast where clouds decreased and broke clear. Over UDINE area, 8/10th cirrus at 23000'. Over ALPS cirrus decreased to 3-5/10th with 5-7/10th low clouds at 12000'. Over primary target 8 to 9/10th low clouds at 10-12000' and 5/10th cirrus at 27000'.

Over KLAGENFURT, clear with 5/10th cirrus at 27000'.

On return, similar weather to route out with patchy middle clouds west of POLA at 14000'. Clear over ADRIATIC with thin cirrus. Very hazy. Over base, 2-4/10th cumulus, bases 4500', tops 8000'.

Visibility generally 10 miles in haze.

10. Forty a/c returned to base between the hours of 1421 and 1452.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group --- Excellent.

With 485th --- Satisfactory.
With 464 & 465th --- Satisfactory until ALPS were reached
after which no contact be made.

12. Seventeen a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

13. Observations: a. 6 SEFs thought to be ME-109s, and 3 twin-engined transports on AVIANO A/D (4604N-1235E) at 1118 hours, observed from 18000'. B. 50-100 M/T going into FIUME, observed at 4515N-1430E) at 1254 hours from 18000'. C. 1 warship of cruiser type, 2 tankers, and 4 cargo ships in TRIESTE harbor at 1247 hours, observed from 16000'. D. About 200 storage tanks SW of SALZBURG at (4745N-1258E), observed at 1130 hours from 19,600'.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

- 1 - Track chart
- 2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

21 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #201, Operations #186.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 20 April 1945, at 0815 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb the ROVIGO-ADIGE Road Bridge north of Ferrera, ITALY. The Group was led by Captain Ray E. Wells, 760th Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit was by Captain Coleman O. Williams, 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over ALTAMURA at 0933 hours without incident.

3. The 460th was #4 in the Wing order of flight, following the 485th. Since the 485th was eight minutes late, the rendezvous was not accomplished until 0951 hours, five miles north of SPINAZZOLA.

4. Fighter escort, consisting of eight P-51s, was sighted at 1205 hours at (4410N-1049E). Escort was last seen at 1237 hours in the target area.

5. Two a/c failed to reach the primary target:

a. A/c #42-51881 turned back at 1230 hours at (4450N-1126E) due to engine failure and fluctuating turbos. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4420N-1230E).

b. A/c #42-94848 turned back at (4200N-1415E) due to #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4130N-1700E).

6. Forty a/c penetrated to the primary target where a visual run with boxes in trail was initiated.

a. 40 a/c dropped 100 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on the primary target, ROVIGO-ADIGE Road Bridge, at 1234 hours from 23,000' on an axis of 38°.

b. Bomb strike photos show probable hits, with pattern covering entire bridge as well as north and south approaches.

c. All box leaders used auto pilot except the Dog box leader whose C-1 was operating improperly.

7. MAH flak was encountered over the primary target for one half minute before and one half minute after bombs away.

8. Briefed route was flown to the target. The return route was as briefed to (4319N-1205E), then, to avoid built up cumulus clouds, course was altered to (4206N-1301E) to the base.

9. Weather: clear on take off with visibility ten miles in haze. Over mountains 4-6/10th stratocumulus, tops 8-9000', and 3/10th cirrus, bases 25000', which continued for rest of route. Stratocumulus increased to 8/10th over FLORENCE and broke to nil northward.

Over target 3/10th cirrus, bases 27000'. Visibility twelve miles in haze.

On return stratocumulus over mountains had decreased to 4/10th, tops 10000', and cirrus had decreased to 1-2/10th, bases 25000'. Stratocumulus decreased to nil over base. Visibility ten miles in haze.

10. Thirty-nine a/c returned to base between the hours of 1438 and 1507.

a. A/c #9325 landed at FLORENCE A/D with #3 and #4 engines shot out by flak. A/c blew tire on landing. Crew members reported as safe, two having returned to base via troop carrier a/c.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group and Wing -- Satisfactory.

With escort -- Good.

12. One a/c received major flak damage as ten a/c minor damage. There were no reported casualties.

13. Fourteen a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

14. Observations:

a. 150-200 M/T in convoy heading north at (4445N-1150E) at 1300 hours, observed from 20000'..

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart

2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

22 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Operations #187.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 21 April 1945, at 0935 hours, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched to bomb a communications target in ITALY. The Group was led by Major Franklin E. Reeves, Ass't Group Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Captain Lavoid D. Wagner of the 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. Group assembly was over the base at 1020 hours without incident.

3. Rendezvous with the 485th was accomplished over SPINAZZOLA at 1105 hours, the 460th flying in the #2 Wing position.

4. Three a/c returned early:

a. A/c #41-28974 turned back during assembly when its landing gear failed to retract. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4120N-1640E).

b. A/c #44-41050 turned back during rendezvous with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4131N-1620E).

c. A/c #44-49592 turned back during rendezvous with #4 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4130N-1630E).

5. The formation consisting of 39 a/c climbed to 17700' on a heading of 301° and at 1215 hours encountered a cirrus upper deck. Formation was sandwiched between a 10/10th stratocumulus deck at 10000' and a cirrus deck at 20000' which lowered as the Group proceeded north on course. The formation continued to climb, keeping in trail of the 485th by a slight turn to the left. At 1229 hours at (4300N-1217E), the Group let down from 19500' to keep out of the cirrus deck and at 1248 hours the 485th requested the Group leader to dog-leg to the left to avoid another group ahead and on course. At this time, the formation was flying in haze, visibility zero. At 1259 hours a 360° turn to the left was made in an attempt to reform the Group. Formation was still letting down.

a. At 1310 hours, recall signal was received from the Wing leader, position of the formation (4412N-1055E), altitude 11,500'. At 1312 hours the formation took a heading of 133° and returned to base.

b. 38 a/c returned bomb loads, 10x500 lb RDX bombs, .1N and .01T fusing, to base. One a/c jettisoned bomb load in the ADRIATIC at (4227N-1432E) because of #4 engine failure.

6. Weather: 7/10th cumulus on take off increasing rapidly on course to 10/10th over APPENINES, west of PESCARA, bases 20-21000'. Scattered stratocumulus over mountains west of FOGGIA increasing rapidly to 10/10th over mountains just north of PISTOIA and then breaking rapidly and appearing quite scattered further north. Cumulus thickened over central ITALY and lowered rapidly to the north with bases at 12-13000' in PISTOIA area. Multilayer conditions appeared to extend over entire PO VALLEY.

On return, clouds lifted slowly to an estimated 20000' in vicinity of PESCARA and FOGGIA, and decreased to 8/10th. Similar conditions rest of route to base. Stratocumulus broke over east slope of APPENINES and was nil along coast to base.

Visibility 15 miles on take off decreasing to 5-10 miles in vicinity of PISTOIA. Visibility 10-15 miles over southern ITALY on return.

7. Radio Communications:

Within Group -- Excellent.
With 485th -- Good.

8. Thirty-nine a/c returned to base between the hours of 1453 and 1530.

9. Fourteen a/c were equipped with cameras.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

WILLIAM C. PALMER,
Captain, Air Corps,
S-2 Duty Officer

1 Incl.
Incl 1 - Track chart

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

24 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #202, Operations #189.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

On 23 April 1945, forty-three (43) scheduled B-24 a/c took off commencing at 0700 hours to bomb communication targets in north ITALY. The forty-three a/c forged two attack units. Red One and Red Two.

I. FIRST ATTACK UNIT:

1. The first attack unit, Red One, consisting of 21 a/c, was dispatched to bomb the PADUA Road Bridge in ITALY. The formation was led by Colonel J.M. Price, Group Commander.

2. Red One assembled over the base without incident and departed ANDRIA at 0818 hours, three minutes late, due to adverse strong winds. Rendezvous was accomplished satisfactorily but there was, at first, considerable confusion among the groups as to order to Red, Blue, Green and Yellow forces.

3. Fighter escort, 15 P-51s, first sighted at 0951 hours at (4430N-1508E), furnished escort on penetration. The escort was last seen at 1021 hours at (4537N-1438E). Fighters were apparently briefed on different call sign, using "HOUSETOP" Red & Blue—instead of "PLATOON" as given in Operations Order 189.

4. Twenty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target, PADUA Road Bridge, where a visual run by boxes in trail was initiated.

a. 21 a/c dropped 50.5 tons of 1000 lb RDX bombs, .1N-ndyT fusing, on the bridge at 1145 hours from 22000' on an axis of 162° TC.

b. Bomb strike photos show pattern on NE approach with some bombs on adjacent highway intersection.

c. On the bomb run a prevailing wind of 320° 100 knots caused an unusually high ground speed, necessitating large course and rate corrections.

d. The attack leader used auto pilot on the bomb run. Baker leader used PDI because of difficulty getting in trail with Able Box. Charlie leader changed to PDI because of auto pilot malfunction.

e. One a/c had four bombs hung up over the target which were jettisoned thirty seconds after bombs away.

5. SIH flak was observed at 1139 hours at BREGANZE (4542N-1130E) at 22000'. An estimated four guns fired about fifteen brown-colored bursts above and trailing the formation. SIH flak was observed at (4535N-1145E) south of CITTADELLA at 1142 hours from 22000'.

6. Route was flown as briefed to (4545N-1142E). This position was used as an IP because the lead bombardier, in view of strong winds, advised a longer bomb run. Return route was as briefed.

7. Weather: On route 4-6/10th cumulus over the SPUR, bases 5-6000', tops 12000', rapidly decreasing to clear over ADRIATIC and rest of route over the APPENINES to the target.

Target weather, clear.

On return, few widely scattered cumulus over southern ADRIATIC and southern ITALY. Few cumulus over southern slopes of ALPS and extensive towering cumulus over ALPS and to the west.

Visibility twenty miles.

8. Thirty a/c returned to base between the hours of 1321 and 1337.

9. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Excellent.
With 485th	-- Satisfactory.
With 464-5th	-- Satisfactory.
With escort	-- Satisfactory.
With WX a/c	-- Satisfactory.

10. Two a/c received minor flak damage. There were no reported casualties.

11. Seven a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

II. SECOND ATTACK UNIT:

1. The second attack unit, Red Two, consisting of twenty-two a/c, took off commencing at 0716 hours to bomb the CAVARZERE Road

Bridge in ITALY. The formation was led by Major Glenn L. Chamberlain of the 762nd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group assembled over the base at 0755 hours and departed ANDRIA at 0821 hours. No other groups were seen.

3. Fighter escort was not sighted at any time.

4. Three a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c #42-52053 turned back during assembly with #3 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

b. A/c #44-50524 turned back at SPINAZZOLA with a gas leak. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #44-49633 turned back at (4432N-1054E) with #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

5. Nineteen a/c penetrated to the primary target, CAVARZERE Road Bridge, where a visual run by boxes in trail was initiated from the briefed IP.

a. 11 a/c dropped 27.5 tons of 1000 lb RDX bombs, .1N-ndyT fusing, on the bridge at 1133 hours from 21400' on an axis of 120°.

b. Bomb strike photos show as good concentration covering the bridge with possible hits and near misses. Another pattern can be seen at the southern approach of the bridge.

c. PDI was used on the bomb run by box leaders.

d. Able box did not drop on the target because of a malfunction on the bomb run of the release lever in the lead a/c, a freezing of rate motor in the deputy lead a/c, and failure of intervalometer in #3 a/c.

(1) Six a/c of this box returned bombs to base and one jettisoned bomb load in the ADRIATIC at (4424N-1253E).

(2) One a/c of Baker box had bomb load hung up over target. Bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC at (4355N-1310E).

6. On route the formation experienced MAH flak for one minute at (4505N-1046E) at 1118 hours at 21000'. It is believed that the unusually strong prevailing wind caused the formation to fly within range of the MANTOVA defense area.

7. Because of strong head winds, the heading enroute was altered at (4300N-1510E) to a course leading directly to the Key Point. From this position course enroute and on return was as briefed.

8. Weather for Red Two was the same as for the first attack unit, Red One, explained in para I7, including target conditions which were CAVU.

9. Nineteen a/c returned to base between the hours of 1307 and 1320.

10. Seven a/c received minor flak damage. There were no reported casualties.

11. Radio communications within the Group were good, and fair with the 485th. No other contacts were attempted. Considerable interference was experienced from ground stations in the front line area apparently using channel "A".

12. Seven a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart

2 - Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

25 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #203, Operations #190.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 24 April 1945, forty-two (42) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched at 0730 hours to bomb the CASARSA, ITALY, Diversion Bridge. The Group was led by Major Franklin E. Reaves, Ass't Group Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Lt. Ovie C. Mensinger of the 760th Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group Assembled in the normal area at 0820 hours but found it necessary to make sharp turns to avoid a collision course with the 465th assembling in the same area at the same altitude. Departure from ANDRIA was at 0848 hours as briefed.

3. Fighter escort, consisting of fourteen P-38s, first sighted at 1034 hours at (4523N-1509E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. Escort was last seen at 1139 hours at (4538N-1313E).

4. A/c #42-51492 returned early with #4 supercharger failure. Bomb load was brought back to base.

5. Forty-one a/c penetrated to the primary target, CASARSA Diversion Bridge, where a visual run by boxes in trail was initiated.

a. 34 a/c dropped 82.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N and .01T fusing, on the primary target at 1134 hours from 24,000' on an axis of 154°.

b. Smoke from previous bombing obscured the briefed MPIs. Dog Box leader therefore selected a new aiming point on the west side of the bridge.

c. The seven a/c of Easy Box, finding the primary target smoke-obscured and apparently well-hit, turned toward the uncovered SPILIMBERGO Road Bridge, about five miles to the north, dropping 17.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.01T fusing, on this target at 1143 hours from 23,000' on an axis of 150°.

d. Bomb strike photos show patterns on the approaches and both ends of the CASARSA bridge, with the main concentration on the eastern

side. Some possible hits or near misses are seen at the SPILIMBERGO bridge, with the main pattern extending beyond the target.

e. Box leaders used auto pilot on the bomb run with the exception of Easy leader who used PDI because of anticipated prop wash.

f. Three a/c had ten bombs hung up over the primary target due to malfunctions: Three bombs were jettisoned one minute after the target on the rally at (4556N-1255E), and seven bombs were jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

6. No target or route flak was encountered or observed.

7. Briefed route was followed to (4237N-1544E) where interference from a B-17 group (unit unknown) necessitated a parallel course to the right which was flown to (4629N-1542E). Coming back on the briefed course in the target area the last box of the second attack unit ran through the B-17 group without, apparently, disrupting the formation of the B-17s or B-24s.

Easy and Fox boxes of the 460th made 360° turns in the vicinity of the IP to allow time for smoke from previous bombing to clear over the target.

Return home to base was as briefed.

8. Weather: clear on take off and over ADRIATIC. Over YUGOSLAVIAN coast 2/10th cumulus, increasing to 5/10th along slopes of ALPS north of UDINE, and decreasing to 1/10th over target.

On return 1-2/10th cumulus over ADRIATIC increasing to 6-8/10th heavy cumulus over the SPUR and 5/10th cumulus over the base.

Visibility generally 15-20 miles.

9. Forty-one a/c returned to base between the hours of 1312 and 1347.

10. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Good until vicinity of (4610N-1400E) and thereafter considerable interference on channel "B".
With 485th	-- Satisfactory.
With escort	-- Group leader was unable to contact escort until just before the IP when reception was indistinct.

11. Fourteen a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

12. Observations: a. 200 tank cars in BOROVINICA M/Y (4557N-1423E) at 1053 hours, observed from 20,000'. b. 10-12 large ships in TRIESTE harbor at 1137 hours, observed from 24,000'.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart
2 - 3 Photo

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

26 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #204, Operations #191.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 25 April 1945, thirty-one scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched at 0830 hours to bomb the LINZ South Main M/Y, AUSTRIA. The Group was led by Lt. Colonel Rayford B. Whitley II, Group Operations Officer, and the second attack unit by Lt. Vahan Marderian of the 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group assembled in the normal area at 0930 hours and departed ANDRIA at 0950 hours, number four in the Wing formation.

3. Fighter escort, consisting of eighteen P-38s, first sighted at 1135 hours at (4510N-1451E), furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. The escort left the formation at 1345 hours at (4722N-1448E).

4. Three a/c failed to reach the target:

a. A/c #44-41336 turned back at (4627N-1337E) because of oxygen failure. Bomb load was returned to base.

b. A/c #44-49592 turned back at (4530N-1432E) with #1 engine failure. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #44-50417 turned back before the target and landed at ZARA. (No further information available)

5. A/c #44-50467 turned back at (4717N-1353E) because of inverter failure and fluctuating manifold pressure. This a/c on the return route bombed the KLAGENFURT North M/Y, dropping 2.5 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, on this target at 1255 hours from 20,500' on an axis of 350°.

a. Bombs were observed to fall just west of the center of the M/Y.

6. Twenty-seven a/c penetrated to the primary target where a visual run by attack units was initiated. Smoke from previous bombing and from smoke generators obscured the briefed MPI until late in the bomb run.

a. 27 a/c dropped 66.5 tons of 500 lb RDX, .1N&.025T fusing, on the primary target, LINZ South Main M/Y, at 1325 hours from 26,000' on an axis of 166°.

b. Bomb strike photos show two good concentrations in the South M/Y, causing oil fires, with at least twenty hits in the northern end and about twenty hits in the southern half. Additional hits are observed in the western portion of the adjacent steel works but smoke precludes a detailed assessment.

c. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by the Group leader. (Lead a/c of the second attack unit is missing, believed to be at PEGS, HUNGARY, as explained in paragraph 10c.)

d. One a/c lost four bombs at (4830N-1415E) when the bomb bay doors were opened.

7. The Group experienced M-IAH flak over the target. There were predicted concentrations for 2-3 minutes before the BRL, and extremely accurate continuous pointed IAH flak for about one minute on the rally after BRL. White bursts were very small and compact. Some black bursts were seen to divide into two smoke puffs in the shape of a dumbbell. Other black bursts left spiral trail for several hundred feet before main bursts were seen. More smoke rings were observed than usual. Scattered red bursts were also seen but apparently not used as signals.

8. Route to and from the target was as briefed.

9. Weather: clear on take off and over the ADRIATIC and YUGOSLAVIAN coast. Few scattered cumulus over DINARICS and ALPS, occasionally becoming 5-6/10th over ALPS. North of ALPS, 3-5/10th cumulus decreasing to 2/10th north and NE of target. Few very high cirrus over ALPS and AUSTRIA. Cirrus appeared very thick to the west.

Target clear except for few high cirrus.

Return clear except for 2-3/10th cumulus over southern ADRIATIC and ITALY.

Visibility 15-20 miles.

10. Twenty a/c returned to base between the hours of 1554 and 1657.

a. Six a/c, 0398, 8998, 0417, 9372, 9332 & 9598 landed at ZARA.

b. One a/c was lost: a/c #0381, with one engine and hydraulic system shot out by flak, flew on automatic pilot until about five miles from ZARA when the crew bailed out. Three of the crew are reported safe at ZARA. No other information is available at this time. (Report received here from Wing A-3)

c. One a/c is missing: a/c #9672, lead of the second attack unit, had two engines shot out by flak and headed for the Russian lines. A/c last observed at (4709N-1424E) at 1355 hours on a heading for PECS, HUNGARY, under control and escorted by fighters. At 1437 hours Group ground station intercepted call from this a/c saying he was landing at PECS, at 1440 hours. This call was acknowledged by Wing ground station.

11. Radio communications was good within the Group, with other groups in the Wing, with the fighter escort and with weather a/c.

12. Two a/c received major flak damage and twelve a/c minor damage.

13. There were two reported casualties: one gunner was wounded in the shoulder by flak and another was wounded in the right arm.

14. Ten a/c were equipped with cameras. Selected strike photos are attached.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

- 1 - Track chart
- 2 - 2 Photos

HEADQUARTERS
460TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 520, U.S. ARMY

27 April 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission #205, Operations #192.

TO: Commanding Officer, 55th Bombardment Wing (H),
APO 520, US Army.

1. On 26 April 1945, thirty-one (31) scheduled B-24 a/c were dispatched at 0800 hours to bomb a target in north ITALY. The Group was led by Major F.E. Barrett, C.O., 763rd Bomb Sqdn (H), and the second attack unit by Lt. R.W. Harclerode of the 761st Bomb Sqdn (H).

2. The Group assembled without incident and departed ANDRIA at 0920 hours.

3. Fighter escort, consisting of eight P-51s, first sighted at 1142 hours at (4220N-1120E), furnished penetration cover. The escort left the formation at 1200 hours at (4650N-1250E).

4. Three a/c returned early:

a. A/c #44-49512 turned back at (4648N-1325E) with #3 engine failure and #2 engine losing power. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC and a/c landed at ZARA. Crew returned to base via C-47.

b. A/c #42-51492 turned back at (4445N-1430E) with #4 engine out. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

c. A/c #44-50655 turned back at (4545N-1430E) with one engine out. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC.

5. Twenty-eight a/c penetrated to the IP of the primary target where 10/10th low and middle clouds merging with 10/10th cirrus deck, tops estimated at 30,000', made it impossible to bomb visually. The formation flew to the second alternate where similar weather prevailed. The Group leader then flew toward the KLAGENFURT M/Y. Due to the severe frontal conditions, the formation split up enroute and Bake, Charlie and Dog boxes, after an unsuccessful attempt to pick up KLAGENFURT, took headings directly for the base.

a. The six a/c of Able Box made a PFF run on KLAGENFURT M/Y from an IP at (4658N-1455E), dropping 12 tons of clustered 100 lb RDX bombs, .1N&.025T fusing, on this target at 1253 hours from 26,800' on an axis of 251°.

b. Results were not observed. Bomb strike photos show complete undercast.

c. PFF operator gave four course corrections and six sighting angles of 70, 68, 65, 62, 58 & 53 degrees. There were no PFF, bombsight or rack malfunctions. Coordination between the pilot, bombardier, navigator and PFF operator was excellent.

d. Auto pilot was used on the bomb run by the Group leader.

6. Of the twenty-two a/c of Baker, Charlie and Dog boxes, 18 a/c returned bomb loads to base, three a/c jettisoned bombs in the ADRIATIC, and one a/c is missing (See paragraph 10b.).

7. SIH flak was reported by some crews at two points on route, believed to be CELJE and ZAGREB, but due to solid undercast, accurate positions are not known and this information is considered unreliable.

8. Briefed route was flown to vicinity of IP for primary target when course was changed for second alternate, and then for KLAGENFURT. Because of severe weather and frontal conditions all navigation was by DR with PFF aid. Return to base for Able Box was as briefed. Baker, Charlie and Dog boxes, after unsuccessful attempt to pick up KLAGENFURT in 10/10th weather, took headings directly for the base.

9. Weather: clear on take off, with 2/10th cirrus at 23000' off the SPUR. 2-3/10th low clouds south of RIMINI which increased to solid undercast near APPENINES and PO VALEY with 8-10/10th middle clouds at 15000'. Low and middle undercast continued northward over ALPS with cirrus deck increasing to 10/10th and lowering to merge with middle deck. Tops of clouds estimated at 30000'.

Over target, formation was flying in clouds at 26500'.

On return heavy clouds continued southward over northern YUGOSLAVIA and over ADRIATIC except for haze limiting visibility to five miles.

10. 26 a/c returned to base between the hours of 1445 and 1534.

a. A/c #1325 & 9512 landed at ZARA. A/c #1325 has since returned to base.

b. A/c #1325 is missing, last seen going down in a wide, slow spiral, with #1 and #2 engines feathered, NW of KLAGENFURT at (4700N-1330E) at 1234 hours. A/c was lost from view in the clouds by reporting a/c which was at 25000'. A radio message from the missing

a/c, heard at 1240 hours, reported two engines feathered, then contact was lost.

11. Radio communications:

Within Group	-- Very poor.
With 464th	-- Good enroute to target area.
With 465th	-- Unable to contact.
With escort	-- Very good.

12. One a/c received minor flak damage. There were no reported casualties.

13. Ten a/c were equipped with cameras. A bombs away photo is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

STRATFORD CORBETT,
Captain, Air Corps,
Group S-2

2 Incls.

1 - Track chart

2 - Photo

Annex #4

C O M M E N D A T I O N S

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FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
A. P. O. 520

12 April 1945

SUBJECT: COMMENDATION.

TO: See Distribution.

1. The following cables have been sent from the Commanding General, Eighth Army and the Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group, respectively, to the Commander-in-Chief, MAAF, who has passed same to this headquarters with his congratulations and appreciation.

"Much appreciated is the wholehearted support of the Fifteenth Air Force on 9 and 10 April. The carpet bombing in front of our assaulting divisions, I am convinced, has been one of the decisive factors in our rapid advance to the Santerno River. The degree of success attained shows how enthusiastically all personnel tackled these close support missions. I fully realize the special and intensive training that this task demanded of all bombing crews."

"I want you to know how fully I appreciate the splendid and effective air support which the air forces have already given us in the current attack. The excellent cooperation we have received from all air force personnel starting with the early planning phase has been a source of special gratification. I am confident of you all-out support in the future. Our ai-ground team is now a great success."

2. I am particularly gratified to pass these well-earned commendations to all units of the command and to add my own praise for an outstanding demonstration of successful coordinated effort between air and ground forces.

/s/ N. F. TWINING
/t/ N. F. Twining
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION
"H" plus AOC, 205 Group, RAF

TRUE COPY

William C Palmer
Captain, Air Corps

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
APO 520 U.S. ARMY

25 April 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: See Distribution

1. It is desired that the attention of all personnel be called to the following message from the Commanding General, AAF/MTO referring to the results of the Easter War Bond Drive recently conducted in this Air Force:

"I desire to commend you and those responsible for the gratifying results of the Easter War Bond Drive and for this excellent display of patriotism and interest in the furthering of the war effort."

2. I repeat my sincere appreciation and praise for this splendid achievement.

/s/ N. F. Twining
/t/ N. F. TWINING
Major General, USA
Commanding

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"H"

TRUE COPY

WILLIAM C. PALMER,
Captain, Air Corps

ANNEX #5

ENCLOSURES AND SUPPORTING

DOCUMENTS

BATTLE CASUALTY
AND
MISSING CREW REPORTS